

# CAPMAN

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INDERES CORPORATE CUSTOMER

# EXTENSIVE REPORT



# Scale-up time

CapMan is currently in the midst of the largest fundraising cycle in its history, raising capital simultaneously for nearly all of its strategies. If the fundraising is successful, earnings should also scale up significantly. The share valuation is favorable if earnings growth materializes in line with our forecasts. We reiterate our EUR 2.10 target price and Accumulate recommendation.

## An international alternative fund manager

CapMan is a Nordic asset manager focused on alternative asset classes. The company's business is divided into two areas: the Management Company business and balance sheet investments. The Management Company business focusing on alternative funds is the core of CapMan's business, as balance sheet investments are mainly made in funds managed by the company.

In recent years, CapMan has placed a strong emphasis in its strategy on internationalizing its investor base, and investors from outside the Nordic countries have become CapMan's largest customer group. At the same time, the product offering has been expanded to new investment areas through the Dasos and CAERUS acquisitions, and the share of real assets in assets under management has risen to 80%. The group structure has also been streamlined by divesting services outside the core business (JAY and CaPS). A key obstacle to the strategy's progress has been the challenging fundraising market, which has clearly slowed the company's organic growth.

## Success in fundraising makes a big difference

We made no estimate changes in connection with our extensive report. We continue to expect the company's earnings to improve significantly over the next two years. This earnings improvement is driven by the company's largest fundraising in its history, which it must succeed in, particularly with regard to its flagship funds (European Forest Fund IV, Infra III, Nordic Real Estate IV, and CAERUS VIII). As growth materializes, fee profit should continue to

scale up, and we estimate a clear upward adjustment in fee profit from its current modest level. In addition to successful new sales, the company also needs strong cost control to properly scale up fee profit.

Earnings growth is accelerated not only by fee profit but also by carried interest, which has been at a gloomy level in recent years due to the sluggish exit market. Several significant funds should now enter into carry during 2026–2027. Our forecasts show a significant improvement in the earnings mix as the share of fee profit increases. This is important to CapMan because it supports an acceptable valuation as business predictability improves.

According to our calculations, CapMan's cash flow will exceed its earnings in the coming years due to capital released from the balance sheet, which will increase the company's flexibility in terms of capital allocation. We expect the company to continue its generous dividend policy. It also remains actively on the lookout for acquisition targets to accelerate its growth strategy.

## Valuation is cheap as long as earnings growth materializes

In our view, the sum-of-the-parts (SOTP) approach is clearly the best way to value CapMan because it most accurately reflects the individual parts' different profiles. The total value of the SOTP is EUR 2.1 per share. This calculation is based on the assumption that fee profit will significantly improve in the coming years. If fee profit were to remain at the current level, the fair value of the share would be below the current share price. Relative and absolute valuation multiples also support this view. Without clear growth in fee profit, there is no upside to the stock, and, should our forecasts materialize, the stock would be cheap. The expected return on the stock is primarily based on earnings growth but is also supported by a strong dividend yield.

## Recommendation

### Accumulate

(was Accumulate)

### Target price:

### EUR 2.10

(was EUR 2.10)

### Share price:

EUR 1.76

## Business risk



## Valuation risk



	2025	2026e	2027e	2028e
Revenue	63.0	73.3	88.6	85.0
growth-%	9%	16%	21%	-4%
EBIT adj.	25.8	34.4	46.5	40.7
EBIT-% adj.	41.0 %	47.0 %	52.5 %	47.8 %
Net Income	13.2	21.6	28.5	23.8
EPS (adj.)	0.09	0.13	0.17	0.15
P/E (adj.)	21.4	13.1	10.1	12.0
P/B	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6
Dividend yield-%	6.3 %	7.4 %	8.0 %	8.5 %
EV/EBIT (adj.)	13.4	9.1	6.8	7.5
EV/EBITDA	13.2	8.9	6.7	7.4
EV/S	5.5	4.3	3.6	3.6


Source: Inderes

## Guidance

(Unchanged)


CapMan estimates assets under management to grow in 2026. The company also expects the profitability of fee income from continuing operations to grow during 2026. The estimates do not include possible items affecting comparability.

## Share price




Source: Millistream Market Data AB

## Revenue and EBIT % (adj.)



Source: Inderes

## EPS and dividend



Source: Inderes

## Value drivers

- Growth in product sizes in core strategies
- New products
- Profitability scaling with growth
- Improving cost-efficiency
- Good investment returns will be accompanied by rising carried interest income and balance sheet investment income
- M&A

## Risk factors

- Weakening investment income and falling short of customer expectations
- Failure of cost control
- A general decline in the attractiveness of alternative asset classes
- High dependency of earnings on investment returns

Valuation	2026e	2027e	2028e
Share price	1.76	1.76	1.76
Number of shares, millions	177.4	177.9	178.4
Market cap	312	313	314
EV	315	316	306
P/E (oik.)	13.1	10.1	12.0
P/E	14.5	11.0	13.2
P/B	1.7	1.6	1.6
P/S	4.3	3.5	3.7
EV/Sales	4.3	3.6	3.6
EV/EBITDA	8.9	6.7	7.4
EV/EBIT (adj.)	9.1	6.8	7.5
Payout ratio (%)	107%	88%	112%
Dividend yield-%	7.4 %	8.0 %	8.5 %

Source: Inderes

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# CapMan in brief

CapMan is a Nordic asset manager focused on unlisted assets, founded in 1989.

## 2001

Listing on the main list of Nasdaq Helsinki

## 66.3 MEUR

Revenue rolling 12 months Q1'26

## 24.7 MEUR

Adj. EBIT rolling 12 months Q1'26

## 8.1 MEUR

Fee profit rolling 12 months Q1'26

## 7.2 BEUR

Assets under management (AUM) Q1'26

## ~230

Headcount

### 2009-2015

The financial crisis hit CapMan hard, and costs spiraled out of control as it expanded too fast.

Returns on funds raised at the peak of the previous cycle remain weak.

The company initiates major restructuring, and several investment strategies are discontinued.

### 2016-2023

Norvestia acquisition changes CapMan's ownership structure and combines the share series.

New strategy and new investment teams.

The company establishes several new investment areas, fundraising is mainly going well.

The investor base is expanding and internationalizing.

Expansion to forest funds through an acquisition.

CaPS is developing strongly and will be separated into its own company

Despite the growth, the Management Company business is not yet scaling up properly.

### 2024-


The service business is divested, and the strategy focuses on the fund business.

The focus is increasingly on real assets and international markets.

Continued growth and profitability improvement in the Management Company business.


Due to a wider fund selection, carried interest income should be more systematic in the future.

Investment income continues to play a key role in the company's strategy and results.



# Company description


## Management Company business




## Balance sheet investments



## Value drivers



# Simplified Management Company business model



# Ownership

## Diversified ownership base

CapMan's ownership structure differs significantly from many other asset managers on Nasdaq Helsinki, as the company's largest owners are not its founders, and the ownership base is otherwise very diversified. The largest, and only, owner with over 10% ownership is Silvertärnan AB, a company partly owned by the Chairman of the Board, Joakim Frimodig. Otherwise, the largest owners are investors, and the tenth largest owner holds just over one percent of the company.

## The ownership structure does not hinder arrangements

In our view, CapMan's highly fragmented ownership structure provides it with significant leeway for M&As. Since the ownership is no longer in the hands of individual founders, the ownership structure does not create "mental blocks" in a scenario where the entire company would be sold or be part of a larger merger, for example. We believe that decision-making among the main owners is primarily guided by long-term shareholder value development, and the toolkit also includes all possible M&A scenarios.

## Management, Board, and employee ownership is at a very high level

As a pioneer in the industry, CapMan has already undergone a "generational change," and virtually all original founders have left the company's service. Typically for the industry, CapMan has aimed to align the interests of owners and management through shareholdings, and the majority of the company's Management Group holds at least a moderate ownership in the company. In addition, management and other key personnel are covered by an extensive option program.

We also note that due to CapMan's structure, several Management Group members have minority ownership in the businesses they lead, as well as the opportunity to earn a share of the funds' carried interest. While these incentives are not directly linked to the share price, the underlying drivers are very consistent with those of equity investors. Naturally, fund performance (carried interest income) is the starting point for everything in this business, and in addition, the profitability of the underlying business areas is also critical for share investors.

Overall, it can be stated that the Management Group and the Board of Directors have a significant financial interest in CapMan. We naturally welcome this, as it strengthens the common interests of the management and shareholders.

## Employee satisfaction at a high level

CapMan's employee satisfaction (eNPS) has averaged around 50 between 2021-2025, which is an excellent level both absolutely and relatively. High employee satisfaction is also reflected in the company's rather low turnover, especially for key personnel. Employee satisfaction is naturally absolutely critical in CapMan's industry.

## Biggest owners 5/26

Silvertärnan Ab	12.8%
Hozainum Partners Oy	5.1%
Ilmarinen	4.9%
Mikko Laakkonen	4.2%
Dolobratos Oy Ab	3.1%
Varma	2.1%
Vesasco Oy	1.8%
Elo	1.5%
VER	1.4%
Hannu Laakkonen	1.1%

## Management holdings

Management holdings	Shares	Role
Pia Käll	331320	CEO
Atte Rissanen	321748	CFO
Heidi Sulin	180172	COO
Jyri Hietala	0	Managing partner, Natural Capital
Mika Koskinen	30000	Managing partner, Wealth
Antti Kummu	81117	Managing partner, Growth
Mika Matikainen	204259	Managing partner, Real Estate
Michael Morgenroth	0	Managing partner, Real Asset Debt
Anna Olsson	64160	Head of Sustainability
Ville Poukka	296787	Managing partner, Infra
Mari Simula	440260	Head of Fund Investor Relations
Antti Uusitalo	15000	Managing partner, Special Situations

# Management Company business 1/9

## A fund manager focused on alternatives

CapMan's business is focused on fully unlisted asset classes and professional investors. The company's Wealth asset management service also includes high-net-worth individuals, but the significance of this business is small for the group. CapMan previously had a significant service business (CaPS and JAY Solutions), but these were divested in 2023 and 2024.

At the end of Q1'26, CapMan's assets under management were 7.2 BEUR. The Management Company business comprises six investment areas, which are: Private Equity & Credit, Real Estate, Infra, Natural Capital, Real Asset Debt, and Wealth. The company's business is international, and it has offices in eight countries (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Germany, and France). Most of the funds under management come from outside Finland, which distinguishes CapMan from its domestic peers.

## Client base is concentrated in large institutions

CapMan has succeeded in significantly expanding its investor base over the last 10 years. While previously the majority of capital came from a small group of large domestic investors, the investor base is now clearly broader and more international. While the share of investors outside Finland was around 10% in 2017, in 2025, around 55% came from outside the Nordics. CapMan does not disclose Finland's share of the capital, but we estimate it to be around 25%.

CapMan has around 200 clients in its funds, and investors have over 30 MEUR in investments in CapMan's funds. Correspondingly, the company has around 350 clients in Wealth, and their average investments with CapMan are 1.5 MEUR.


CapMan's current and potential client base can be roughly divided into four categories: large institutions, medium-sized institutions, small institutions, and high-net-worth retail clients. We understand that the majority of the company's fund capital under management comes from domestic and foreign institutional investors, which are classified as large. For example, pension companies invest in alternative products mainly through third-party funds (such as CapMan). This differs, for example, from the fixed income and equity investments of pension funds, which are typically managed from start to finish by their investment teams. In addition to pension companies, large institutional clients include international investment and insurance companies. We understand that these so-called Tier I clients provide the majority of the company's AUM.

The second important group of clients is medium-sized and small institutional clients (Tier II & Tier III clients), including foundations and smaller pension funds. High-net-worth individuals are also a target group for CapMan's Wealth service area. CapMan has virtually no retail investors as clients.


## Products are mainly closed-end funds

Investing in unlisted assets means making direct, mainly majority-owned investments, for example, in unlisted companies or real estate. Investments are typically made through closed-end private equity funds, which raise capital from institutional investors such as pension companies and foundations. The funds' investment teams actively seek to develop their target investments together with the management of the target company. The aim is to increase the value of the target company by, e.g., streamlining the strategy, improving operational efficiency, and accelerating growth through acquisitions. Debt leverage also often plays an important role in investment activities.

AUM breakdown by investor type



Geographical distribution of AUM



# Management Company business 2/9

## Fee structure

CapMan's fees consist of three components: management fees (funds and asset management), carried interest income (funds), and sales of services. Management fees are recurring in nature, and their predictability is excellent, as CapMan's assets under management are very permanent. In 2025, management fees accounted for ~80% of all fees. Sales of services include fees from asset management and certain services produced for real estate funds. We believe these fees are also mostly recurring, although they include certain non-recurring components. These fees accounted for approximately 13% of the company's revenue in 2025.

Recurring fees have grown rapidly since 2017, averaging 14% per year (adjusted for divested service businesses). Growth has naturally been driven by AUM development, which has also grown by 14% during the same period. According to our calculations, around one-third of the growth came from acquisitions (JAM 2019, Dasos 2024, and CAERUS 2025), meaning organic growth accounted for approximately 10%.

## Performance-linked fees


As is typical for private equity, CapMan's own funds include a performance-linked component (carried interest income), which generates significant fees for the management company if the investment is successful. Depending on the type of fund, the typical hurdle rate varies between 7% and 10%, and the company is entitled to carried interest income on annual returns above this. Carried interest is typically distributed at CapMan so that the team responsible for managing the fund receives around 60%, and CapMan receives 40%. This is in line

with general industry guidelines, where large professional investors want the team to be strongly committed to the fund's performance. CapMan's income statement mainly shows only the portion attributable to CapMan, but in certain special cases, the entire profit distribution may also be reflected in CapMan's income statement.


CapMan's Management Company business's carried interest income has been around 4 MEUR per year in 2017–2025, which is a modest level both in absolute and relative terms. The modest level of carried interest income is explained by the poor performance of the funds in the early part of the period due to the financial crisis. However, the investment performance of the funds has improved significantly since 2013. Around 40% of funds established before 2017 exceeded the set hurdle rate, while for funds established since then, the figure is significantly higher, around 80%, according to our estimates. We note that the modest carried interest income in recent years is explained by a quiet exit market. If CapMan can maintain the current performance of its funds, where a significant portion of its funds reach the carried interest threshold, this means significantly higher carried interest income in the future.

We note that the exact timing and amount of carried interest income are impossible to predict due to a number of factors affecting the timing and size of the final exits. When examining carried interest income, investors should focus on its development over a slightly longer period. We would like to remind you that performance fees are also a kind of quality guarantee for investors, because if the underlying funds do not meet their return targets, raising capital for new funds will also become significantly more difficult.


Revenue development (MEUR)



Relative revenue development



# The typical lifecycle of an unlisted fund



If the fund performs well, the role of performance fees can be very significant

In closed-end funds, capital is tied up for over a decade, and the predictability of management fees is high

Managing a closed-end fund requires significantly more resources than a traditional equity/fixed income fund.

- In the first stage, the management company raises the capital to be invested in the fund from investors.
- Third-party sales agents can also be used for fundraising.
- Fundraising can also continue in the early part of the investment phase.

- In the investment phase, the capital raised by the fund is allocated to investment targets.
- The funds are quite concentrated and, depending on the type of fund, the number of targets is usually 10-15.
- The final duration of the phase will depend, e.g., on the general market situation and the availability of targets.

- The value creation of a fund can typically be divided into three channels: 1) operational development of assets, 2) use of leverage, and 3) increases in asset valuation multiples relative to the time of acquisition.
- The increase in valuation multiples is the value driver most dependent on overall market performance. Thus, in times of significant uncertainty, it's the operational performance of the assets and the use of leverage that will determine the ultimate success of the investment.

- At the end of the fund's lifecycle, the fund sells its investments, e.g., to an industrial buyer or another investor.
- If the fund's investment activities are successful, the management company receives its share of the profits in the form of performance fees.
- There is, of course, uncertainty about the performance fees, and by no means do all funds exceed the hurdle rate.
- The duration of this phase depends, e.g., on the operational development of the targets and the general activity of the market.

\*Assumptions: Fund size 500 MEUR, CapMan's management fee 1.0%, hurdle rate 8%, IRR 12%, fund's share of return exceeding the hurdle rate 20%, CapMan's share of profit-sharing is 40%.

# Management Company business 3/9

## Assets under management

CapMan reports its assets under management with the following breakdown: Real Estate, Infra, Natural Capital (Dasos), Real Asset Debt (CAERUS), PE & Credit, and Wealth. CapMan's AUM does not include double-counting, and the company always records capital primarily as fund capital. If the company, e.g., also has funds under a discretionary wealth management agreement, this portion of the funds will be reflected in the fund capital.

## Real Estate

Real estate funds and mandates accounted for 3,794 MEUR of CapMan's assets under management at the end of Q1'26. CapMan manages seven real estate funds and several investment mandates, operating in all Nordic real estate sectors in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Norway. In recent years, the company has introduced new open-ended real estate funds (Hotels II, Residential, Social, Nordic Property Income) alongside the traditional closed-end real estate funds (Nordic Real Estate funds). Real estate has become by far the most important product group for CapMan. The role of open-ended funds has grown, and according to our calculations, their share of AUM is already over half of all real estate funds.

After a strong growth spurt (2019–2022), new sales of Real Estate clearly weakened, and AUM stagnated in 2022–2024 due to the sharp rise in interest rates. In 2025, the company performed excellently, given the circumstances, and was able to grow in a challenging market. The growth is explained by sales to open-ended funds and the Midstar transaction carried out by the Hotels II fund.

The value creation strategies of CapMan's real estate funds can be divided into two. In the value creation strategies,

real estate projects are actively developed by changing their intended use. CapMan's Nordic Real Estate fund family represents this strategy.


Income-driven strategies (e.g., Hotels II, Residential, Nordic Property Income) focus on the rental cash flows of properties. The latter strategy is dependent on the development of required real estate returns and tenant demand, while the investment team has more influence on the success of value creation strategies. An estimated more than half of the current capital of CapMan's real estate funds is invested in income-driven strategies.

Fee levels vary significantly between funds, and, e.g., in the Nordic Real Estate (NRE) funds, we estimate the average management fee to be around 1%, while we estimate the level to be less than 0.5% in mandates. According to our calculations, the average fee level for real estate is around 0.7%, which is in line with international peers. The performance fee potential of real estate funds is considerable due to their large size. The company has a performance-based component in all its funds, but performance fees have been tight in recent years due to the weak market.


## Natural Capital

In late 2023, CapMan announced that it would expand into forest funds by acquiring the entire share capital of Dasos Capital. In connection with the transaction, CapMan established a new investment area – Natural Capital. The investment area currently includes seven funds covering both open and closed alternative funds investing in forest assets. The funds' capital amounted to around 750 MEUR at the end of Q1'26. According to our calculations, the average fee level is at a good level of around 0.8%.

AUM breakdown by product area (2025)



Inderes' estimate of the distribution of management fees by product group (excluding carried interest)



# Management Company business 4/9

The purchase price was 35 MEUR, which was high both in absolute and relative terms, and we suspect Dasos also had many other interested buyers. The transaction was financed mostly with own shares, and Dasos' owners became some of CapMan's largest shareholders. As part of the transaction, Dasos' former owners/employees will retain all carried interest income from older funds, which is typical for the industry. Dasos' investment focus is on Europe and emerging markets, and the company's operations are highly international.

We feel this transaction is an excellent strategic fit for CapMan, as Dasos provides the company with an entirely new investment area and access to an attractive and growing asset class. Because the Dasos team already has a very strong track record, scaling up is much easier and faster than building a new team. CapMan is currently raising capital for a new forest fund, and the success of this fundraising is absolutely critical to justify the high price tag, considering the excellent strategic fit. The intention is for natural capital private equity to become a significant pillar for the company in the coming years.

## Infra

The capital managed under Infra, established by CapMan in 2017, was 549 MEUR at the end of Q1'26. The capital under management consists of CapMan's two infrastructure funds, as well as investment mandates and co-investments. According to our calculations, the average fee level is a strong approximately 1%. CapMan Infra invests in infrastructure targets in the energy, transport, and telecommunications sectors in the Nordics.

Fundraising for the first fund was below our expectations, and the fund fell well short of its target size of 300 MEUR,

reaching 190 MEUR. We believe that the slower-than-expected fundraising is explained by the fact that this was a completely new product area for CapMan, and the fund was the investment team's first. The fundraising for the second fund, on the other hand, was successful, and the fund's final size rose to 375 MEUR, very close to the targeted 400 MEUR.


Although Infra is still a relatively new investment area, its development has been very strong. The Infra 1 fund has performed excellently and is practically certain to generate significant carried interest. The second fund has also performed strongly, even though it still has a significant portion of its lifecycle remaining.

CapMan is currently raising a new infrastructure fund (targeted size 750 MEUR), and if fundraising is successful, Infra would become a significant pillar for CapMan. We believe the company will seek to expand its infrastructure product offering in the coming years (mandates, club deals, etc.), once the third fund has been successfully raised. Infra, like forest, is at the core of CapMan's strategy, and its relative share is intended to grow significantly.


## Real Asset Debt

In summer 2025, CapMan expanded into real estate debt investing by acquiring a majority stake in CAERUS Debt Investments AG, a German company focused on real estate debt. With the transaction, CapMan established a new Real Asset Debt investment area. The investment area currently manages seven funds, with a combined AUM of 585 MEUR in Q1'26. CAERUS is one of Germany's first real estate debt investors, and its team has a strong track record and good historical performance. Historically, CAERUS has focused on the DACH and Benelux regions.

AUM development (MEUR)



Relative AUM development (MEUR)



# Management Company business 5/9

The purchase price for the 51% stake was a maximum of 6.6 MEUR, which we consider quite favorable (EV/EBITDA < 8x) and value-creating even without synergies. The transaction was financed with cash, and CAERUS' CEO, Michael Morgenroth, remained with the company with a 49% stake and joined CapMan's Management Group. In line with industry practice, the carried interest income from the old funds remained with the target company's team in connection with the transaction.

Strategically, the transaction was a very logical step, as it provided CapMan with access to a new asset class and the Central European market with a relatively small investment. The transaction opened up clear synergy opportunities for the company, particularly related to leveraging CapMan's fundraising engine to support CAERUS' growth and expanding the business geographically in both directions. Unlike the significantly more expensive Dasos transaction, the CAERUS arrangement has a lower threshold for creating shareholder value due to a much lower purchase price. CAERUS is also fundraising for its next fund, and its success is critical.

In early 2026, CapMan also announced its expansion into infrastructure debt by appointing René Kassis as head of the area and opening an office in Paris. The expansion is a logical step on paper, but the timing was a surprise to us, as it further increases the number of funds CapMan has in fundraising.

## Private Equity

Private equity investments include Growth, PE programs, Special Situations, Credit, and Buyout funds. Capital under private equity was 935 MEUR in Q1'26. All funds in the area are closed-end funds. From an investor's perspective, the

most important products are Growth and PE programs. Growth has significant performance fee potential, and the fund size can still grow from the current level. PE programs, on the other hand, have considerable room for further growth. For Credit, CapMan is not seeking significant growth from its current size, and the company's Buyout operations are coming to an end. Special Situations is a small thematic fund with limited growth potential.


Although the asset classes under Private Equity are not core real asset investments in CapMan's strategy, they complement CapMan's product offering. PE programs, in particular, play an important role in the company's asset management business. However, we do not expect the company to open new product areas under Private Equity, and we consider it a very realistic possibility that the number of product areas under Private Equity will be lower than at present in 5 years.

## Wealth


The Wealth service area focuses on serving high-net-worth individuals and smaller institutions, mainly in Finland. The core of Wealth's offering consists of private equity programs and allocation mandates. At the end of Q1'26, Wealth had assets under management of approximately 609 MEUR. We note that this AUM does not include the approximately 300 MEUR of PE program capital shown under Private Equity, nor investments made by Wealth's clients in CapMan's own funds. The current Wealth was built on the back of JAM Advisors, acquired in 2019.

Although wealth management is not CapMan's core business, we see clear strategic value in it, as it provides CapMan with a strong distribution channel to smaller domestic institutions and ultra-high-net-worth private clients.

Management fee % development




Performance fees/AUM-%



# Life cycles of investment areas

	Initial stage	Developing	Established	Fully scaled
Flagship fund generation	1	II/III	III/IV	IV+
Profitability of fee income	0–10%	10–30%	10–40%	20–40%
Impact of carried interest income	-	Developing	Significant but variable (lower in open-ended funds)	Significant and stable (lower in open-ended funds)
Focus	Building a return history	Exploring adjacent areas and expanding the offering, e.g., into open-ended funds	Leveraging synergies in business	Economies of scale



# Management Company business 6/9

## Sales are a key driver for the share price

CapMan's new sales are the single most important metric for long-term success. Since CapMan's AUM is mainly in closed-end structures and real assets, whose values do not fluctuate with the market, the annual growth of AUM, adjusted for acquisitions, provides a very accurate picture of the company's net new sales. In addition, CapMan itself reports new sales on an annual basis, and a corresponding figure can also be derived from this when it is related to AUM growth adjusted for acquisitions.

According to our calculations, with its current AUM, CapMan needs 500–600 MEUR in annual gross sales to maintain its capital base, as capital is continuously returned to investors from closed-end structures. Capital also flows out of semi-open funds from time to time.

After the 2017 strategy change, CapMan's new sales started to grow significantly, and in 2017–2019, new sales reached a strong trajectory. 2020–2021 was also an exceptional period for CapMan, and new sales performed almost incredibly well, boosted by the zero-interest rate environment. 2022 and 2023 were difficult years for CapMan with weak new sales as the market adjusted to higher interest rates.

In 2024–2025, new sales have picked up again from the bottom, although the market situation has remained challenging in alternative investments. However, new sales have remained sluggish, which has been reflected in challenging fundraising for flagship funds.

We remind investors that weak new sales are reflected with a delay for alternative fund managers. In practice, as a result of sluggish sales, the average age of assets under management will increase, which in turn means a larger capital outflow in the coming years.

## New sales potential


When assessing CapMan's new sales potential, the sales mix plays a rather small role, as all products sold by CapMan inherently have healthy fee structures, and virtually all AUM generates recurring cash flow. In recent years, CapMan has systematically strengthened its international fundraising organization, and the company's fundraising machinery is clearly stronger than in the previous cycle.

According to our calculations, CapMan should be able to achieve average net sales of over 700 MEUR with its current structure. Gross, this means sales of over 1,200 MEUR. The level varies somewhat annually depending on which funds are currently raising capital. Over the past two years, fundraising processes have had to be postponed, and thus, CapMan will have almost all of its relevant products in fundraising during 2026–2027. For this reason, new sales for the next two years should be significantly higher than the average level.


In the short term, the market situation for alternative investments remains challenging, as capital returns are still insufficient, keeping allocations at a high level. In addition, the elevated interest rate level has made interest rates a relevant asset class again, which weakens the demand for alternative products. In the long term, however, the outlook for alternative products remains very strong in the majority of asset classes.

Regarding the fundraising for flagship funds, we believe the Infra III fund (targeted at ~750 MEUR) carries the least risk. Infra as an asset class has held up very well in a challenging market, and CapMan's track record, especially with the Infra I fund, is excellent. The risk of this capital raise is mainly related to the schedule.

Net sales 2015-2025 (estimate)



New sales 2015-2025 (estimate)



# Management Company business 7/9

In our view, there is also a very limited risk associated with the fundraising of Dasos' new forest fund. The team's track record is excellent, and the attractiveness of forest as an asset class has remained high. Given these fundamentals, the fund's sales have been surprisingly sluggish, but we are not particularly concerned about this for now. We calculate that the first closing was around 100 MEUR, and the company is targeting a larger fund size (295 MEUR) than the previous fund. Our estimate is that the target size is between 300-400 MEUR.

For real estate, the key challenge for the new flagship fund, Nordic Real Estate IV, is the market situation. The market situation is truly difficult as the market continues to adjust to elevated interest rates. Indeed, the fund's sales have been very sluggish, and its first closing has been postponed multiple times. However, we believe that the Nordic real estate market, combined with CapMan's strong team, is sufficient to raise the fund to its targeted size (~750 MEUR), but naturally, uncertainty has clearly increased with the market weakness and gloomy fundraising progress.

In our view, the market situation for CAERUS' new real estate debt fund is moderate, but a bigger question mark is that CAERUS has not been involved in the fundraising market for a long time. In principle, the team's track record should be in shape, but a longer break from the fundraising market naturally increases the risk of selling the next fund. We are not particularly concerned that CAERUS will fail to raise a new fund, but the greater risk is related to the fund's size. CapMan's target size for the next fund is 500 MEUR, which we believe is very ambitious, and achieving it would be an excellent performance. We note

that if the fund size were to remain at 300 MEUR, for example, it would still lead to CAERUS turning to strong growth, and in our opinion, this size would already be a good level and reduce the uncertainty associated with CAERUS' outlook.

Regarding smaller products, we consider the fundraising success of Nest and Growth likely, as the funds are relatively small and have good track records. We also note that the significance of a single smaller product for CapMan is very limited.


Regarding Wealth, we find the outlook good, and CapMan should be well-positioned to sell it at a significantly higher volume than at present. The question here is primarily about the company's ability to expand its customer base in Finland, which we believe is a key impediment to growth.

With the annual net sales potential of over 700 MEUR that we have outlined, the growth in recurring fees would be around 5–6 MEUR, which in turn would mean an annual growth in recurring fees of approximately 10–15%. Naturally, strong new sales would also increase the potential for performance fees. CapMan itself aims for over 15% annual growth in recurring fees, which roughly translates to over one billion euros in net sales.

We note to investors that the size of the market does not limit CapMan's growth potential, as most of its capital is raised from international investors. In our view, the question is above all about the company's ability to get its sales engine running again at its full potential. Naturally, the recovery of the alternative funds market also helps in this regard.

Sales outlook by product group	Short-term	Long-term
Real Estate	2	3
Forest	3	5
Infra	4	5
Real estate debt	2	4
PE & credit	2	3
Wealth	3	4

Share of investors outside the Nordics (%)



# Management Company business 8/9

## Profitability comparison of asset management

CapMan's Management Company business's profitability has historically been very weak, and at the time of the 2017 strategy overhaul, CapMan's fee profit was, according to our calculations, significantly in the red. We note that CapMan's reported historical group figures look clearly better, as the highly profitable Services business covered the losses of the Management Company business. Group expenses were also very high at this time, and the segment reporting based on the Management Company business consequently appeared significantly better than reality. In 2020, due to strong growth and previously implemented cost savings, the fee profit finally turned positive, albeit at a very modest level. Profitability did not scale significantly in 2020–2023, but 2024 saw a small upward adjustment to +10% as a result of the Dasos acquisition.

However, profitability based on recurring income is still very modest and significantly below the company's own targets or key peers. CapMan has not given an exact target level for the Management Company business but has spoken about profitability scaling faster than revenue growth. At the 2022 CMD, the company stated it was targeting a fee profit margin of over 40%, but this also included the highly profitable service business, and adjusted for this, the level would be ~30% according to our calculations. Although this target is no longer valid, we believe it gives a realistic picture of the company's target level.

When examining the EBIT margins of international alternative asset managers, they have consistently been at levels of 50-70%. We note that the global managers in the comparison are all significantly larger than CapMan, and the AUMs of the smallest mid-cap category managers are in the tens of


billions. The graph also clearly illustrates the significant economies of scale available in asset management.

CapMan's profitability level is also modest compared to its domestic asset management peers (comparison on the next page). We note that CapMan's business ties up significantly more resources than a traditional asset manager, and as a result, we believe the company, with its current structure or size, does not have the prerequisites to reach the profitability levels of leading domestic asset managers. Correspondingly, however, CapMan's performance fee potential is greater than that of several peers, and this should bring profitability closer to its peers.

## Cost structure of the Management Company business

The cost structure of the Management Company business is quite fixed, as is typical for the industry, and the most significant expense item is personnel costs. At the end of 2025, CapMan employed 230 people, with virtually all personnel working in the Management Company business. In 2025, total personnel costs were around 39 MEUR, and we estimate the average employee cost to be around 183 KEUR/year. This level is among the highest for domestic peers, reflecting the company's international personnel distribution and generous remuneration policy. We note that at CapMan, investment teams also receive a significant share of the carried interest income from the funds they manage, and in addition, key personnel in the teams typically have a minority holding in the business they manage. Considering these factors, CapMan's personnel cost per person would be the highest among domestic asset managers.

Other expenses amounted to 13.3 MEUR and mainly consist of external services, IT, and premises costs.



\*2017–2020 fee profit calculated by adjusting the group's figures to exclude the Services segment.

\*\*Mega-cap: Blackstone, Brookfield, Apollo, KKR and ARES  
 Large-cap: Carlyle, EQT, Blue Owl, TPG, CVC, Man Group, Partners Group, ICG, Hamilton Lane, and StepStone  
 Mid-cap: Tikehau, Bridgepoint, Eurazeo, and Antin

# Management Company business 9/9

Depreciation in 2025 was 3 MEUR, split roughly equally between PPA depreciation from intangible acquisitions and IFRS 16 lease-related depreciation. PPA amortizations are non-cash flow affecting and thus should be adjusted out when calculating CapMan's earnings.

## Profitability potential

While CapMan's Management Company business's profitability has clearly improved, it is still very modest and has not scaled as we expected. In particular, growth in personnel costs has consistently outpaced our expectations and partly overshadowed the growth in fee income. In addition, in recent years, the company's organic growth has been weaker than expected, and growth has largely come from corporate acquisitions (Dasos and CAERUS). Therefore, profitability has not been able to scale.

It is clear that CapMan's business has significant scaling potential from its current level, and the company's own strategic goals also indicate this. When growth finally takes off, it will be paramount for the company to succeed in cost control so that growth translates as efficiently as possible to the bottom line.

Over the past 4 years, CapMan's fee profit operating leverage has been very modest, at only around 20%. This is a weak level, as companies in the sector typically all achieve over 50% and the best ones achieve 70-100% earnings leverage.

We estimate CapMan's fee profit margin to rise to around 20% over the next two years. The level is still not staggering, and we consider it a kind of minimum level


that the company should reach. In our opinion, it is clear that with the company's targeted AUM of over 10 BEUR, the fee profit margin should be +30%.

Investors should also note that carried interest income is a significant source of income for CapMan. Considering carried interest income, the company's profitability potential is clearly higher than the business based on recurring fees. With our outlined normalized level of carried interest income, the impact of carried interest income on CapMan's EBIT margin is over 10%, which raises the total margin in our estimates to around 30%. The level is already moderately in line with domestic asset management peers, but still far from international players.


## Minority interest is significant

In our opinion, when analyzing CapMan's asset management result, the income shares attributable to minorities should also be taken into account. CapMan has several significant minority interests (e.g., CapMan owns 60% of Infra), and the minority interest's share of earnings relative to fee profit is considerable. In 2025, the earnings share attributable to minorities was 2.6 MEUR, and this fully originated from operational activities. When the full impact of CAERUS is considered, we estimate the minority interest to be slightly over 3 MEUR. This is 30-40% of the fee profit after taxes. Since such a significant portion of CapMan's most valuable earnings flows to minorities, this must be taken into account, especially in valuation.

Profitability of Asset and Wealth Management businesses (2025e)\*



EBIT % of the Asset and Wealth Management business



\*Inderes' comments:

- The profitability of UB's Asset Management is burdened by group costs and depreciation
- Titanium, CapMan & Alexandria at group level, excluding goodwill and PPA amortizations
- Group expenses recognized for CapMan
- Asset Management of eQ is burdened by group costs
- Evli's profitability considers the group's allocations
- Taaleri's profitability is burdened by group costs. At Taaleri, investment income from private equity funds is also included in performance fees

# CapMan's funds and programs

Private equity funds	Established	Funds raised (EUR)	Carried interest income	IRR-%*
CapMan Buyout VIII	2006	440	Will not achieve	< 8%
CapMan Buyout IX	2009	295	Will not achieve	< 8%
CapMan Buyout X	2013	244	Will not achieve	< 8%
CapMan Growth I	2017	86	In carry	> 20%
CapMan Buyout XI	2019	190	Likely to achieve	10–15%
CapMan Growth II	2020	97	In investment phase	-
CapMan Special Situations	2021	70	In investment phase	-
CapMan Growth III	2024	130	In investment phase	-

## Debt funds

Nest Capital 2015	2016	100	In carry	5–10%
Nest Capital III Fund	2021	82	In investment phase	-

## Real Estate funds

CapMan Nordic Real Estate I	2013	273	In carry	~10%
BVK Nordic Residential mandate	2016	820	Mandate	-
Kokoelmakeskus	2016	47	Achieved	> 10%
CapMan Nordic Property Income	2017	72	Open-ended fund	-
CapMan Nordic Real Estate II	2017	425	Likely to achieve	> 10%
CapMan Hotels II	2019	800*	Open-ended fund	-
CapMan Nordic Real Estate III	2020	564	In investment phase	-
CapMan Residential Fund	2021	803	Open-ended fund	-
CapMan Social Real Estate	2024	200*	Open-ended fund	-

## Natural Capital funds

Dasos Timberland Fund I	2009	-	Total carried interest to the team	-
Dasos Timberland Fund II	2014	-	Total carried interest to the team	-
The Foraois Ltd Partnership	2016	-	Total carried interest to the team	-
Dasos FS Partnership	-	-	Total carried interest to the team	-
Dasos LT Partnership	-	-	Total carried interest to the team	-
Dasos Habitat Fund Ky	2019	-	Total carried interest to the team	-
Dasos Sustainable Forest and Wood III	2021	295	Open-ended fund	-

## Infra funds

CapMan Nordic Infrastructure I	2018	190	Likely to achieve	> 10%
CapMan Nordic Infrastructure II	2022	375	In investment phase	-

## Real estate debt

CAERUS Real Estate Debt Fund I	-	Total carried interest to the team	-
CAERUS Real Estate Debt Fund II	-	Total carried interest to the team	-
CAERUS Real Estate Debt Fund III	-	Total carried interest to the team	-
CAERUS Real Estate Debt Fund IV	-	Total carried interest to the team	-
CAERUS Real Estate Debt Fund V	-	Total carried interest to the team	-
CAERUS Real Estate Debt Fund VI	-	Total carried interest to the team	-
CAERUS Real Estate Debt Fund VII	-	Total carried interest to the team	-

## Program funds





CW Investment Partners Fund I	2021	90	No carried interest component	-
CW Investment Partners Fund II	2022	60*	No carried interest component	-
CW Investment Partners Fund III	2023	60*	No carried interest component	-
CW Investment Partners Fund IV	2024	120	No carried interest component	-

## In fundraising/entering fundraising

		Target size
European Forest Fund IV	2025	300–400*
Infra III	2026	750
Nordic Real Estate IV	2026	750
CAERUS VIII	2026	500
Nest IV	2026	100*
Special Situation II	2026	100*
Growth IV	2027	150*
CW Investment Partners Fund V	2026	150*

\*Inderes' estimate





# CapMan relative to listed domestic asset managers 1/2



**Inderes' comments:**

- All are group-level numbers
- Revenue per employee is calculated with the average number of employees
- Agents were included in personnel and personnel costs
- Taaleri's 2021 figures e adjusted for divested Wealth Management business.

# CapMan relative to listed domestic asset managers 2/2



# Investment business 1/2

Balance sheet investments play a key role in CapMan's business, and own balance sheet investments have accounted for the majority of the group's total results in recent years. In line with its strategy, CapMan invests mainly in its own funds, so the result of the investment business is strongly linked to the Management Company business.

## The structure of the portfolio

At the end of Q1'26, roughly 135 MEUR (~75%) of CapMan's investment assets were invested in the company's own funds. Other fund investments in the investment portfolio (some 42 MEUR) consist mainly of investments in external private equity funds.

In the strategy period that began in 2017, CapMan had to act as an anchor investor in almost all of its new funds to strengthen investor confidence as it underwent a major transformation and reorganized its investment teams. For example, for the Buyout XI and Infra I funds, CapMan had to make investment commitments of more than 30 MEUR, well above the company's own long-term target level (1-5% of the fund). Even though newer fund categories still require significant investment commitments, balance sheet investments do not play such an important role in the overall context. CapMan made a 10 MEUR commitment to its latest forest fund, which we believe indicates the scale of the company's future investments in flagship funds.

At the end of Q1'26, CapMan had cash assets and other liquid assets worth around 69 MEUR. The exceptionally high cash weight is explained, e.g., by the company's large investment commitments (Q1'26: some 56 MEUR) to its own funds, as well as probable new commitments to new funds.


We calculate that CapMan should release significant capital from balance sheet investments in the next couple of years. The key drivers for this are the gradual recovery of external fund investments and the company's previous generation of large funds entering the exit phase. According to our calculations, at least 80 MEUR in capital will be released before the end of the decade, and we find it difficult to see CapMan fully reinvesting this capital back into its own funds.

We estimate that the size of CapMan's investment portfolio will decrease from the current 180 MEUR to at least 160 MEUR by the end of the decade. We welcome this, as the size of the investment portfolio relative to CapMan's market value is very large. From an investment case perspective, we believe it would be logical for the investment portfolio's role not to be so dominant in the company's value.


## The portfolio's contribution to earnings is significant

PE funds have the highest value creation potential in CapMan's investment portfolio, and the company's own target is to achieve an annual return of 15% for these funds. At the other end of the scale are infra funds, forest funds, and lower-yielding real estate funds, where we believe the target annual return is around 7-10%. We do not take cash weight into account in our calculations, so we only look at the expected return on invested capital. CapMan's own target is to achieve a return of over 10% for its investment portfolio, and we consider this a realistic level. Since 2016, the average annual change in the fair value of CapMan's investment portfolio has been around 10%.

Fund investment breakdown Q1'26 (MEUR)




Breakdown of investment commitments Q1'26 (MEUR)




# Investment business 2/2


Investment portfolio return and size




Change in the investment portfolio's focus



Return on investment portfolio (MEUR)



Amount of investment commitments




# Strategy and financial targets 1/5

## Strategy progress

### Real assets at the core

Real assets account for ~80% of AUM


Share of real assets in AUM (%)



### International growth

Systematic expansion of the investor base, especially internationally


Share of investors outside the Nordics (%)



### Expanding the product offering

New investment areas and expanded product offering

AUM development by investment area (BEUR)



### Streamlining the group structure

Acquisitions in new investment areas (Dasos, CAERUS) and divestments of non-core units (JAY, CaPS)

#### + Acquisitions

##### Dasos Capital

Forest and natural capital

2024

##### CAERUS Debt Investments

Real asset debt, DACH

2025

- Divestments

##### JAY Solutions

Reporting & analytics

2023

##### CaPS


Procurement services

2024

# Strategy and financial targets 2/5



The returns of funds managed by CapMan are at the core of long-term value creation



# Strategy and financial targets 3/5

## The financial targets are ambitious

CapMan originally issued its current long-term financial targets at its 2022 CMD and reiterated them at its 2025 CMD. In addition, at the 2025 CMD, the company also provided a set of targets tied to the 2027 strategy period.

## Long-term financial targets

We believe an **average annual growth of +15% in recurring fees** is a reasonable target, as CapMan's entire investment case is highly dependent on revenue growth. However, the 15% target is ambitious, and at the current average fee level, it would mean over one billion euros in net sales annually. The target also includes acquisitions, and CapMan's own calculations likely assume an organic growth contribution of +10%, which would imply a more realistic net sales of +700 MEUR per year.

**The ROE target of +20%** is challenging with the company's current business structure due to the dominant role of the investment portfolio. Although this level is possible, it would require a strong contribution from all three performance components (Management Company business, investment income, and carried interest). In recent years, CapMan has missed the target (average 2018-2025: ~14%).

The equity ratio was 58% at the end of 2025, in line with the company's target of over 50%. Maintaining a sufficient level of equity and liquidity is justified, as CapMan has significant investment commitments in its funds, and earnings and cash flows also fluctuate considerably with the investment income.

CapMan updated **its dividend policy** in 2024. According to the new policy, the company intends to distribute at least 70% of the profit for the financial year, less changes in the

fair value, as dividends. In addition, the company can distribute an additional dividend from investment income. Dividends are also meant to grow over time. With the change, profit distribution is more in line with cash flows from operating activities, which prevents liquidity challenges from arising. The company does not have significant investment needs beyond its investment commitments. However, the amount of dividends may vary significantly between financial years depending on the timing of the cash flows from investment income. We consider the profit-sharing guidance to be quite confusing, and it provides poor reference points, as the lower end of the guidance is very low (EUR 0.03 with 2025 figures). Our interpretation is that CapMan wants to leave itself sufficient financial flexibility over the next couple of years to ensure the achievement of its goals, which is why the dividend is the component that flexes in the calculations. If the company even comes close to achieving its targets for the current strategy period, it would have significantly more flexibility with its profit distribution in the next strategy period. In this scenario, the company would likely return to its previous "steadily growing dividend" policy.

## Targets for the strategy period extending to 2027:

Regarding **assets under management**, at the 2025 CMD, CapMan reiterated the 10 BEUR target by the end of 2027, which it had set in 2022. We believe this target is extremely ambitious, and we find it difficult to see how it could be achieved without new acquisitions. The company will be fundraising for almost all its funds in the next two years, and if fundraising is highly successful, AUM could rise to almost 9 BEUR by 2027. We believe this level would in itself be an excellent performance, and far more important than a precise absolute target is for CapMan to return to robust organic growth.



## Financial targets

### CapMan's new long-term financial targets:

- Growth of Management Company and Service businesses **>15% p.a.**
- Return on equity **>20%**
- Equity ratio **>50%**
- Dividend target of at least **70%** of the profit for the period, less changes in fair value

### Inderes' estimates 2026-2028e:

- Increase in management fees: **10% p.a.**
- Average return on equity: **13%**
- Average equity ratio: **58%**
- Dividend from earnings on average: **+90%**

The recording of the 2025 CMD can be viewed at the link below:



# Strategy and financial targets 4/5

Regarding **assets under management**, at the 2025 CMD, CapMan reiterated the 10 BEUR target by the end of 2027, which it had set in 2022. We believe this target is extremely ambitious, and we find it difficult to see how it could be achieved without new acquisitions. The company will be fundraising for almost all of its funds in the next two years, and if fundraising is exceptionally successful, AUM could exceed 9 BEUR by 2027. We believe this level would in itself be an excellent performance, and far more important than a precise absolute target is for CapMan to return to robust organic growth.

**Management fees** grow in line with AUM growth. This target is logical and indicates that the company does not see significant pressure on its fund fees.

**Fee profit growing faster than management fees** is the company's most important goal after growth. As we have discussed previously, the company's fee profit margin is at a very modest level and inevitably has significant scalability potential. For the company's share price performance, it is paramount that the fee profit margin truly begins to scale with growth.

Regarding **carried interest income**, the company guides that growth will be in line with the growth of closed-end funds. The starting point is an average of 6 MEUR/year in carried interest for 2022-2024. According to our calculations, this would mean carried interest income of around 8-10 MEUR with 10 BEUR in AUM. Relative to AUM, the corresponding figure is ~0.1%, and relative to AUM with carried interest income potential for CapMan, the corresponding figure is 0.2%. For international alternative asset managers, the 10-year average has been 0.2%, and the last 3 years have been at ~0.1%.

## Return on balance sheet ~10% and strong cash flow.

CapMan previously guided an investment portfolio return of 10–15%, but we feel the current level of ~10% better reflects the portfolio's shift towards real assets. The weight of the investment portfolio is currently very different from CapMan's assets under management, and in the longer term, we expect these to be in line with each other. However, we also note that the 10% level can be considered a kind of minimum for own investments, because if fund returns systematically fall below this level, new sales will become more difficult as returns fall below the hurdle rate in an increasing number of products.



## Financial targets

### Objectives for the 2027 strategy period:

- AUM **+10 BEUR**
- Management fees growing **in line with AUM**
- **Scaling** of fee profit
- Carried interest income **growing in line with AUM**
- Return on balance sheet **~10% and strong cash flow**

### Inderes' estimates:

- Management fees relative to AUM: **stable ~0.8%**
- AUM at the end of 2027: **~9 BEUR**
- Carried interest income per AUM: **stable 0.1%**
- Return on balance sheet: **~10%**

Carried interest income/AUM % international alternative managers\*



\* Blackstone, Brookfield, Apollo, KKR, ARES, Carlyle, EQT, Blue Owl, TPG, CVC, Man Group, Partners Group, ICG, Hamilton Lane, StepStone, Tikehau, Bridgepoint, Eurazeo, and Antin

# Strategy and financial targets 5/5

## Acquisitions as part of the future

Acquisitions are an essential part of CapMan's growth strategy, and management has openly expressed its interest in transactions when suitable targets are found. The company has completed two transactions during the current strategy period (CAERUS and Dasos). We find the company's target of 10 BEUR AUM by the end of 2027 overly ambitious organically, and we believe the company is still actively looking for new acquisition targets.

We believe the consolidation in the Finnish financial sector will continue as rapid and we still see a need for reorganization in the market. Small fund management companies and asset managers, for whom the increasing regulation and reporting requirements create too high a cost and investment need relative to the size of their operations, are in the most difficult situation. The biggest challenges for the transactions are probably the different views of business values, the division of management positions in the new company, and cultural factors. In the longer term, however, M&As offer CapMan an interesting opportunity for value creation.

We feel the logical targets for CapMan would be specialized product houses, whose expertise the company could scale using its own sales engine. We do not rule out the possibility of the company being part of a larger, probably domestic, merger either.

## Specialized product houses

We believe the most logical path for CapMan's expansion through acquisitions would be to expand the product offering by acquiring individual investment teams. In this

type of acquisition, CapMan can accelerate the growth of the acquisition target by expanding its distribution through its own sales channels to international investors. This is because smaller local fund management companies may not have the resources to sell their products to large international investors, as this requires a credible brand (such as CapMan), as well as a sufficient back office for due diligence and reporting requirements for potential investors, for example.

An example of such a transaction is the Dasos Capital acquisition. This gave CapMan an entirely new investment area and access to an interesting and growing asset class. The transaction does not provide significant cost synergies, but CapMan is well positioned to accelerate growth.

In terms of the future, an interesting gap in CapMan's product portfolio is at least energy. Among domestic players, e.g., Taaleri's Renewable Energy fund business could be suitable for CapMan, as the funds have been very successful and the team is fairly large even on a European scale. However, the transition would require major changes in Taaleri's strategy, as Energy is at the heart of the company's current business.

In addition, expanding the debt side with an acquisition could be a realistic option, as the current Credit business is small in size and slow to scale up organically.

A product house may well, even probably, be found in other Nordic countries, but we don't know the players in these markets well enough to guess at individual names.

## Major mergers

We understand that CapMan is also open to larger merger arrangements. Among domestic players, CapMan would be an interesting partner, e.g., for eQ. In addition, a merger with Taaleri could make sense, although it would require the separation of Garantia into a separate listed company. Naturally, CapMan could also find interesting partners in other Nordic countries with which to take the new company to the next level. For example, Swedish Catella could be an interesting partner, at least on paper.

## Takeover bid

To our understanding, CapMan's owners have no particular emotional attachment to the company, and a potential takeover bid for CapMan's shares would be based purely on shareholder value. We believe the most likely buyer would be a foreign entity that would like to expand into the Nordics, as we do not identify any other domestic entities besides Mandatum for whom CapMan could be a good fit, even on paper.

## Expanding the investor base

We do not see any relevant acquisition targets for the company in Finland for expanding the investor base, so our eyes are automatically turned to the other Nordic countries. However, we feel the value creation logic in these types of arrangements can be considered questionable, as CapMan is a product house and not an asset manager, so we find it quite unlikely that an acquisition would expand its investor base. It would be better to strengthen distribution through partnerships, for example.

# Investment profile

- 1 The growth outlook for key products is strong
- 2 Significant scalability potential in profitability
- 3 Fee profit is still at a very modest level
- 4 High profit-sharing potential
- 5 M&A transaction option

## Potential


- Growth in product sizes in core strategies and new products
- International new sales
- Profitability scaling up with growth
- Improving cost-efficiency
- Good investment returns will be accompanied by rising carried interest income and on-balance sheet investment income
- M&A transactions

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## Risks

- Weakening investment income and falling short of customer expectations
- Failure of cost control
- A general decline in the attractiveness of alternative asset classes
- High dependency of earnings on investment returns

# Risk profile of the business model



# Industry – Asset management market 1/5

## Alternative asset classes have been the clear winner in asset management

Over the past decade, global alternative markets have grown significantly faster than traditional asset classes. According to Preqin's latest Private Markets in 2030 report (10/2025), alternative asset management AUM is expected to reach around 32 trillion USD by 2030, compared to around 17 trillion USD at the end of 2023. We estimate that growth will remain significantly faster than the industry average in the coming years. According to PwC's 2025 Global Asset & Wealth Management report (11/2025), private markets will generate more than half of all global asset management fee income by 2030, totaling approximately 432 BUSD.

The structural shift is most evident in asset managers' earnings. According to BCG, alternative asset classes account for less than a quarter of global AUM but more than half of the industry's fee income, and this share has increased year by year. Even after the zero-interest rate period, alternative managers have defended their fee margins significantly better than active fund managers, who have faced continuous fee pressure due to the triumphal march of passive products.

## Growth drivers

Growth is driven by several mutually reinforcing trends, which, in our opinion, will not weaken decisively even in an environment of elevated interest rates.

**Institutional investors**, in the big picture, still want to increase their allocations to alternative investments. The motives are a better expected return, diversification benefits, and a duration suitable for long-term liabilities.


The opening of the **private investor channel** is also a longer-term growth driver for alternative products. The private wealth channel is still at a stage where private investors' allocation to alternatives is low compared to institutional investors. Semi-open evergreen structures and other new product types are gradually lowering the threshold for investing.

The number of **unlisted** companies is increasing, while the number of listed companies is decreasing. The number of listed companies in developed markets has been shrinking for two decades, by about 40% in the US and about 60% on the London main list since 1996. At the same time, stock exchange indices are concentrated on fewer and fewer large companies. The unlisted market has taken an increasing share of value creation in the corporate world, forcing investors to seek exposure to the unlisted side.


**The energy transition** and the need for financing real investments are a structural long-term driver, particularly for infrastructure. The public sector's limited balance sheet capacity and structural budget deficits inevitably mean that these investments must be financed with private capital. This includes investments in electricity, telecommunications, and the green transition.

**Secondary and continuation markets** have emerged as a growth area of their own. Liquidity pressures and prolonged divestments have created structural demand for secondary funds, whose growth rate, according to Preqin's estimate, is the fastest in the entire alternative segment (over 13% p.a. 2023–2029).

Global AUM distribution (Source: BCG)



Global fee income by product (Source: BCG)



# Industry – Asset management market 2/5

## Outlook for asset classes

While the overall growth of the alternative investment market appears structurally strong, there are significant differences in the outlooks for various asset classes. In terms of size, private equity will remain the backbone and largest single class in the market, but short-term challenges are evident: the exit market has been quiet since 2022, and exits starting is also a prerequisite for fundraising to normalize. In our view, infrastructure and natural capital investments offer the strongest structural outlook. In infrastructure, long-term drivers such as the energy transition, AI, digital infrastructure, and defense, as well as limited public funding, ensure strong long-term growth prospects. Natural capital investing, in turn, plays an essential role in mitigating climate change, and investors' allocations to this asset class are still very low on average. We note, however, that natural capital investing as a whole is a clearly smaller asset class than, for example, infrastructure.

For real estate, we are very close to the bottom of the cycle, but recovery will be slow due to higher interest rates than before.

## Competition is intensifying, and polarization is deepening

The flip side of market growth is an intensifying competitive situation. Capital continues to flow into alternative asset classes at historically high levels, new players are entering the market from both traditional asset managers and new specialized teams, and at the same time, the return potential of target markets is normalizing. The leverage provided by the zero-interest-rate period has disappeared, and valuation levels no longer support returns in the same way as in the 2010s, as competition for good assets has generally intensified. In combination, this means that

achieving excess returns is essentially more difficult than before, and average returns are decreasing.


This will inevitably drive the asset class towards a clearer polarization between good and weak managers. When the market does not provide significant traction, the manager's own ability to create value is emphasized. The best managers will continue to have no problems raising capital or defending their fee margins. The weaker mid-tier, on the other hand, faces growing difficulties: fundraising is slowing down, institutional investors are concentrating their allocations on fewer partners, and competition is cutting into fee margins.

While the industry's fee levels have held up very well so far, we believe it is clear that increased competition will be reflected in the industry's margins.


## The industry's growth outlook is strong, but the tide no longer lifts all boats

In summary, we see that the industry's growth environment remains strong, but the polarization between managers is increasing. There are fewer excess returns available than before, and simply allocating to alternatives is unlikely to provide excess returns on its own. Instead, investors must be able to pick the right managers and products. Capital is increasingly concentrating on players with a strong track record, and mediocrity will inevitably lead to business contraction in the long term.

Fundraising for Europe-focused funds (BEUR)



AUM of European-focused funds (EUR trillion)



# Industry – Asset management market 3/5

## There are strong growth drivers in the asset management market in Finland

Unlike banking, we believe asset management can be expected to grow faster than the general gross domestic product. In our view, there are four key forces driving the growth of the asset management market:


- 1) Existing wealth, which we estimate to grow by approximately 3-5% per year on average.
- 2) New savings, which at the current savings rate are 3% of GDP. We assume that approximately one-third of new household savings will end up in asset management (+1% of AUM). In addition, savings from companies and other entities end up in asset management. Overall, new savings support an annual AUM growth of 1-2% in our calculations.
- 3) The share of current savings that shifts from other asset classes (such as housing or bank accounts) to asset management, as large and wealthier age groups transfer their assets to their more investment-prone heirs. Assessing this item is very difficult, but we believe this will also be a supportive development for the asset management sector. In our calculations, we have assumed this to have a positive annual impact of approximately 1% of assets under management.
- 4) Changes in AUM fee levels. In our view, there is still downward pressure on fee levels, especially for traditional investment funds, as these are still quite high in Finland compared to international levels, despite a declining trend. In addition, the growing popularity of passive products mainly comes at the expense of Finnish asset managers, as these are primarily offered cheaply by large international fund

houses. A significant portion of new wealth invested in passive products does come through asset managers (asset management agreements), but the fee level for these is very modest. The outlook for alternative products, on the other hand, is clearly better, as these always require the fund company to negotiate investments and manage holdings. We estimate that the negative impact of the decrease in fee levels on AUM is around 1% per year.

Based on these assumptions, we estimate that the asset management market's AUM will grow by 5-8% per year and fee income by approximately 4-7% per year. In addition, international sales offer competitive product houses (e.g. Mandatum, Evli, Aktia, eQ, CapMan, Taaleri) the potential to grow faster than the Finnish market. In the long term, we believe that the asset management market in Finland is well positioned to continue its annual growth of about 5%, so it still remains a clear growth sector.

When outlining the growth rate, it should be noted that if the savings rate remains unchanged, net subscriptions will gradually decrease relative to existing assets without clear economic growth. Asset values can be expected to grow continuously at fairly stable growth rates, while new investments in euro terms will remain roughly unchanged without economic growth. In other words, economic growth should be at least as great as the growth in asset values for the ratio of net subscriptions to capital to remain constant or increase. Of course, an increase in the savings rate could counteract this effect.

## Asset management market drivers



# Industry – Asset management market 4/5

Structure of the Finnish asset management market by customer size and product positioning




Source: Inderes

# Industry – Asset management market 5/5

## Asset management competition



## Consolidation drivers



## Finalized M&A transactions



# Financial position 1/2

CapMan's balance sheet is of significant size and clearly larger than that of listed investment service companies on average. This is explained by the company's significant investment portfolio, and adjusted for this, the balance sheet is clear and simple, similar to other companies in the industry.

## Investments constitute most of the balance sheet

CapMan's balance sheet total at the end of Q1'26 was approximately 342 MEUR. The company's investment portfolio, worth 180 MEUR or over half of the balance sheet total, represents the largest part of the balance sheet assets. We have discussed these investments in more detail in previous sections of the report.

In addition to the investment portfolio, CapMan also had a very strong cash position of around 69 MEUR at the end of 2025. In addition, the company has an unused liquidity facility of 20 MEUR. The high cash level is explained by the ongoing fundraising cycle, where CapMan will likely make significant investment commitments to funds being established. In a normal situation, CapMan can, in our estimation, operate with significantly less cash, and we estimate that the cash required for the company's business is around 20-30 MEUR.

## Intangible items originate from acquisitions



The company has 33 MEUR of goodwill in its balance sheet, most of which consists of the Dasos Capital acquisition in early 2024. In addition, the balance sheet includes other intangible assets of around 17 MEUR, which are also largely related to acquisitions. The company makes intangible PPA depreciations of around 2 MEUR per year from these, which have no cash flow effect.

Other assets in the balance sheet consist mainly of working capital items related to normal operations, such as fee receivables from funds and deferred tax assets. Tangible fixed assets on the balance sheet (6 MEUR) mainly consist of IFRS 16 lease liabilities.

## The company uses leverage

CapMan's equity at the end of Q1'26 was 187 MEUR, and the company had 106 MEUR of interest-bearing debt (excluding IFRS 16 lease liabilities) in its balance sheet. Unlike most other asset management companies on Nasdaq Helsinki, CapMan has used financial leverage throughout its history. In our view, this is explained by the company having a significant investment portfolio, relative to which the risk level brought by the debt is very manageable. The company's current ROE target (>20%) in practice also requires the use of leverage. The company currently has 40 MEUR and 60 MEUR bonds outstanding. These mature in Q2'27 and Q2'29 and carry fixed interest rates of 4.5% and 6.5%, respectively.

In our opinion, CapMan's current debt can still be considered reasonable relative to the size of the investment portfolio (interest-bearing debt is around 57% of the fair value of investments and only 25% of net debt). The company should be able to repay its loan maturing in Q2'27 on its due date, as by then, visibility into future investment commitments and capital returns from funds will have improved. We find it desirable for the company to pay off the loan, as financing costs are currently quite high, and the company should aim to reduce its cash weight towards a more normal level.



# Financial position 2/2

## Equity ratio best describes the gearing

Although the company has a high equity ratio of 56% and a strong balance sheet, the amount of interest-bearing debt cannot be considered insignificant relative to the size of the company. For example, relative to the EBITDA adjusted for investment income and carried interest income, the debt amount is very high. Considering the cash needs created by investment commitments, we believe that the ratio should be viewed in terms of gross debt, which doesn't deduct cash from liabilities. The current debt amount cannot be justified based on the operational result and cash flows, so CapMan's credit rating is largely tied to the company's investment portfolio.

When assessing the strength of CapMan's balance sheet, the best single indicator is the equity ratio, as the assets on the balance sheet consist mainly of investments whose liquidation value can be assumed to be at least moderately close to their book values, thus safeguarding debt repayment capacity. CapMan's gearing target (>50%) and covenants protecting lenders of financial liabilities are also linked to the equity ratio. Covenant levels are not public information, but we estimate these to be somewhat below the company's target level. In addition to equity, the covenants concern CapMan's net gearing, which partly explains the large cash position in the balance sheet.

## Significant off-balance sheet liabilities

In addition to interest-bearing liabilities, CapMan had off-balance sheet investment commitments totaling some 56 MEUR at the end of Q1'26. Commitments are widely

diversified across various funds and strategies. In practice, the commitments mean that CapMan is also committed to investing its own funds in the fundraising stage. Investments in own funds are in line with CapMan's strategy and the company's long-term objective is to make investments that equal 1-5% of the start-up capital of a new fund.


Other liabilities in the balance sheet consist mainly of trade payables and other non-interest-bearing liabilities related to operational business.

## The timing of investment income fluctuates cash flow


When looking at CapMan's cash flows from operating activities, it should be noted that investment income recorded at fair value may not correspond to its cash flows in the short term. This is because funds are valued quarterly at fair value, and the change is recognized as income or loss in the income statement. Investments only turn into cash flow when the fund's investment targets are eventually sold at the end of the fund's lifecycle and the capital is returned to investors.

Typically, however, there is no significant delay between the profit or loss recognition and the repatriation of cash flows, as the largest revaluations are usually made when the fund sells its investments at the end of its lifecycle. Therefore, cash conversion of investment income is already fairly good over a period of more than 12 months. An exception to this is periods like those in recent years, where sales of investment targets are delayed as market transaction activity cools down.

Fund investment distribution 2025 (MEUR)



Distribution of investment commitments 2025 (MEUR)



# Estimates 1/4

## Background of estimates

Global capital markets have continued their strong performance despite geopolitical tensions. However, this has only had a limited impact on alternative investment classes, which are still digesting the overheating of the previous up-cycle. Key challenges in alternative asset classes include consistently lower-than-expected capital returns, which have resulted in allocations remaining at a high level. In addition, the rise in interest rates as a relevant asset class has reduced the attractiveness of alternative investments. Although alternative products are a key part of an investment portfolio, rising interest rates are intensifying competition and emphasizing product quality. The significance of interest rate products for CapMan is very limited, and thus, rising interest rates have weighed on CapMan's short-term growth outlook due to weakened demand for alternative products. In our opinion, it is clear that the worst is already over for alternatives, and the question is more about the rate of recovery.

## Estimate revisions and summary


We made no estimate changes in connection with the extensive report. In the big picture, our earnings improvement estimates have consistently shifted forward in recent years due to gloomy fundraising and the postponement of carried interest income. At the EBIT level, we still expect CapMan's sustainable earnings potential to be over 40 MEUR once the next fundraising cycle is successfully completed. However, our EPS estimates have fallen sharply over the past couple of years as financing costs have risen, the number of shares has increased (Dasos), and the minority share of earnings has risen (CAERUS). Overall, our view of the earnings potential has declined in recent years.

We continue to expect a significant earnings improvement in the coming years as a result of successful new sales and the realization of carried interest income. We note that although fundraising has been gloomier than expected, the company has continuously taken measures to strengthen

its international fundraising capabilities. Thus, the company should be in a good position once the market situation finally begins to ease.

For investors, the most important earnings component in the coming years is profitability based on management fees, i.e. fee profit. The fee profit is currently quite modest and has significant scalability potential. As several investment areas move into a more mature phase, the profitability of the Management Company business should scale from its current level. Between 2025 and 2028, an average of ~50% of the growth in recurring fees will flow through to earnings. We feel the bar here is not particularly high, as long as sales are strong. Naturally, the company must also succeed in cost control to some extent, but with even stronger cost control, the company has the potential for even better scalability. Historically, cost control has not been one of CapMan's greatest strengths, and this, along with the rate of new sales in the coming years, is one of the key uncertainties in our estimates.

Estimate revisions MEUR/EUR	2026e			2027e			2028e	
	Old	New	Change %	Old	New	Change %	Old	New
Revenue	73.3	73.3	0%	88.6	88.6	0%	85.0	85.0
EBIT excluding NRIs	34.4	34.4	0%	46.5	46.5	0%	40.7	40.7
EBIT	32.1	32.1	0%	44.1	44.1	0%	38.3	38.3
Profit before tax	27.6	27.6	0%	39.7	39.7	0%	34.2	34.2
EPS (excl. NRIs)	0.13	0.13	0%	0.17	0.17	0%	0.15	0.15
Dividend per share	0.13	0.13	0%	0.14	0.14	0%	0.15	0.15



# Estimates 2/4

## 2026 requires success on many fronts

CapMan's starting points for 2026 are exceptionally clear: the company is undertaking the largest fundraising in its history, as it raises capital for all its funds over the next two years. Success in this fundraising will determine CapMan's success in the coming years.

In 2026, the most important fundraising efforts will be for three proprietary flagship funds: European Forest Fund IV, Infra III, and Nordic Real Estate IV. The success of CAERUS' latest 8th fund in raising capital is a plus, but its significance for the overall story is minor, as CapMan owns only 51% of CAERUS. Capital is also being raised for PE programs, thematic funds, and open-ended real estate funds.

Our estimates assume that the company will succeed in these fundraisings at least moderately, and as a result, AUM will grow to around 8 BEUR. The biggest uncertainty relates to CAERUS and NRE4 due to the difficult situation in the real estate sector. CAERUS has been out of the market for a longer period, which increases the fundraising risk. We are not concerned about the success of fundraising in infra and forest due to the favorable market situation and the strong performance of the funds. We also believe the fundraising outlook for Dasos is good.



We estimate management fees will increase by 14%. Part of this growth is attributable to the inclusion of CAERUS and the group's 2025 fundraising efforts. Fundraising in 2026 will only be partially reflected in the 2026 figures, as fundraising will be concentrated towards the end of the year.

CapMan guides AUM and fee profit to grow in 2026. The informative value of the guidance is low, as a decrease in AUM would be a disaster and would indicate a total failure in fundraising.

For carried interest income, the outlook for the year is binary. The Infra I fund will almost certainly enter into carry, and its potential is considerable. The fund has 3 remaining objects, and the timing of carried interest depends on the timing of exits. We estimate 6 MEUR in carried interest income for this year, of which infrastructure accounts for a significant portion. Excluding infrastructure, carried interest income in 2026 will be very slim, amounting to only a few million.

If growth materializes in line with our estimates, fee profit will certainly improve. The million-dollar question is the rate of improvement. CapMan's fee profit has only improved modestly in recent years, and historically, cost efficiency has not been one of its greatest strengths. An improvement in the fee profit margin is of paramount importance, as it is the single most important driver of the share. We expect that the fee profit will improve significantly with growth, and that about 50% of this growth will flow to the bottom line. This level is moderate compared to other asset managers on the stock exchange, and the best players in the sector have significantly higher earnings leverage. The minority interest in earnings should also grow slower than fee profit.

We expect a return of around 10% from the investment portfolio, and overall, we estimate CapMan's adjusted EBIT to be 34 MEUR (adjustments mainly for PPA amortizations). This translates to an EPS of EUR 0.14, which in turn enables a one-cent increase in the dividend to EUR 0.13. In our view, CapMan's investment portfolio will gradually decrease from its current level towards the end of the decade, and thus the company will be able to easily distribute all its earnings as dividends. By the end of 2026, the company should also have a fairly good understanding of the amount of investment commitments needed for the funds currently being raised, which increases leeway in the balance sheet.



# Estimates 3/4

## New sales will remain strong in 2027

We estimate 2027 to continue the successful fundraising cycle with the final closings of flagship funds. The ultimate success of fundraising will only be measured at these closings. As a result of strong new sales, we estimate AUM to rise to around 8.7 BEUR. Last year's growth is fully reflected in the figures, and growth is supported by the final closings of funds with their retroactive fees. Recurring fees are estimated to grow by 21%.

Regarding carried interest income, 2027 should be an excellent year, as Buyout 11 will also enter into carry in addition to Infra 1. A few smaller funds will also generate carried interest income, and overall, we estimate carried interest to rise to 10 MEUR.

As growth materializes, the fee profit will improve significantly and rise to 24% in our forecasts, which is already a moderate level for CapMan. Similar to 2026, approximately half of the recurring fee growth will flow to the bottom line. However, 2027 earnings will be supported by retroactive fees from the closing of large funds, and adjusted for this, the fee profit is closer to 20%.

If fundraising is successful, CapMan's risk level will decrease significantly: uncertainty about the attractiveness of the funds and the improvement in profitability will diminish.

We expect a return of around 10% from the investment portfolio, and overall, we estimate CapMan's adjusted EBIT to be 46 MEUR (adjustments mainly for PPA amortizations). This level reflects the upper end of CapMan's current earnings potential, and in our 2027 estimate, almost everything goes right. EPS will rise to EUR 0.17, and the company will certainly increase its



dividend. We expect the dividend to increase by one cent to EUR 0.14, but a higher dividend is also possible. At this stage, CapMan has a precise understanding of the investment commitments for new funds and improved visibility into capital returns from older funds. The company has a clear understanding of the investment portfolio's scale, which allows for thinning the balance sheet's liquidity. In our opinion, it would be sensible for the company to pay off at least some of its debts while the investment portfolio shrinks. The company's liquidity position is likely to be very good at the end of 2027, which also increases its leeway in profit distribution.

## Long-term estimates

In our estimates, 2028 is a gap year: flagship funds have been raised, and retroactive fees from 2027 will create headwinds for revenue. We expect revenue to remain roughly unchanged. Carried interest income will normalize, and our estimated EBIT of ~40 MEUR reflects CapMan's earnings potential at that time. The earnings mix has improved significantly at this stage, with fee profit accounting for approximately 40% of the earnings.

In the longer term, our new sales potential supports CapMan's annual recurring fee growth of 5–6 MEUR, which corresponds to an annual growth of around 10%. If the earnings leverage remains at ~50%, fee profit would grow by 15-20% annually. The impact on the group's EBIT is significantly smaller due to the large role of the investment portfolio.

CapMan has significant leeway in its balance sheet towards the end of the decade as the investment portfolio shrinks. This allows the company to invest more in growth or, alternatively, to start paying out profit distribution in excess of earnings.



# Estimates 4/4

MEUR	2023	2024	2025	2026e	2027e	2028e	2029e
<b>Revenue</b>	<b>49.3</b>	<b>57.6</b>	<b>63.0</b>	<b>73.4</b>	<b>88.6</b>	<b>85.0</b>	<b>89.3</b>
Fee income	39.0	45.9	49.7	58.9	69.9	69.1	72.1
Carried interest income	3.1	4.3	4.1	6.0	10.0	7.0	8.0
Fees from asset management services	7.1	7.4	9.2	8.5	8.7	8.9	9.2
Personnel costs	-31.0	-33.3	-39.0	-41.5	-44.0	-46.1	-48.2
Other costs	-12.0	-13.0	-13.3	-14.1	-14.8	-15.5	-16.3
Depreciation	-1.5	-2.4	-3.0	-3.2	-3.2	-3.2	-3.1
<b>Changes in fair value</b>	<b>-6.1</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>15.5</b>	<b>17.5</b>	<b>17.5</b>	<b>18.0</b>	<b>17.0</b>
<b>EBIT</b>	<b>-1.2</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>23.2</b>	<b>32.1</b>	<b>44.1</b>	<b>38.3</b>	<b>38.7</b>
<b>Adj. EBIT</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>19.0</b>	<b>25.8</b>	<b>34.4</b>	<b>46.5</b>	<b>40.7</b>	<b>41.1</b>
<b>Fee profit</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>11.0</b>	<b>19.0</b>	<b>15.7</b>	<b>16.1</b>
<b>EBIT adjusted for investments</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>10.3</b>	<b>17.0</b>	<b>29.0</b>	<b>22.7</b>	<b>24.1</b>
<b>Minority interest's share of earnings</b>	<b>-2.0</b>	<b>-4.9</b>	<b>-2.6</b>	<b>-3.5</b>	<b>-3.7</b>	<b>-3.9</b>	<b>-4.1</b>
<b>Minority share of fee profit</b>	<b>54%</b>	<b>71%</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>32%</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>25%</b>
<b>Recurring fee growth, %</b>	<b>-1%</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>14%</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>-1%</b>	<b>4%</b>
<b>AUM growth, %</b>	<b>-1%</b>	<b>21%</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>4%</b>
<b>Management fees/AUM (%)</b>	<b>0.78%</b>	<b>0.83%</b>	<b>0.75%</b>	<b>0.77%</b>	<b>0.80%</b>	<b>0.77%</b>	<b>0.77%</b>
<b>Recurring fees/AUM, %</b>	<b>0.92%</b>	<b>0.96%</b>	<b>0.89%</b>	<b>0.89%</b>	<b>0.99%</b>	<b>0.94%</b>	<b>0.96%</b>
<b>Fee profit margin, %</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>20%</b>
<b>Headcount</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>240</b>	<b>246</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>258</b>
<b>AUM (MEUR)</b>	<b>5005</b>	<b>6062</b>	<b>7210</b>	<b>7998</b>	<b>8738</b>	<b>8978</b>	<b>9368</b>
Private Equity	1,022	1,080	918	930	930	930	980
Real Estate	2,933	3,090	3,754	4,144	4,394	4,394	4,594
Infra	562	648	554	700	950	950	850
Natural Capital	0	726	816	900	1,000	1,100	1,200
CAERUS	0	0	585	685	785	885	985
Wealth Management	488	518	583	639	679	719	759
<i>EPS (adjusted for non-recurring items)</i>	<i>0.02</i>	<i>0.04</i>	<i>0.09</i>	<i>0.13</i>	<i>0.17</i>	<i>0.15</i>	<i>0.15</i>
<i>Dividend/share</i>	<i>0.10</i>	<i>0.14</i>	<i>0.12</i>	<i>0.13</i>	<i>0.14</i>	<i>0.15</i>	<i>0.16</i>
<i>Payout ratio, %</i>	<i>468%</i>	<i>322%</i>	<i>135%</i>	<i>97%</i>	<i>81%</i>	<i>102%</i>	<i>106%</i>
<b>Balance sheet investments</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>170</b>	<b>160</b>
<i>Income from balance sheet investments, %</i>	<i>-3.6 %</i>	<i>4.8 %</i>	<i>8.7 %</i>	<i>10.0 %</i>	<i>10.0 %</i>	<i>10.0 %</i>	<i>10.0 %</i>

# Valuation 1/4

## Valuation summary

We have used the sum-of-the-parts analysis as the starting point for CapMan's valuation. We feel the sum of the parts is the best method for CapMan, as it best considers the company's structure, which differs from its peers, and the different natures of the company's parts. In addition, we have also examined the valuation through relative and absolute valuation. As supporting methods, we have also examined the value through AUM-based pricing and the DCF model.

CapMan's share price development has been subdued for the past three years. The weak share price development is explained by a significant slowdown in the company's new sales, primarily driven by challenges in alternative investment products caused by rising interest rates. The challenging market has significantly slowed down CapMan's organic growth and the scalability of its fee profit. The slow exit market has also been reflected in carried interest income, which has been at a modest level in recent years. Finally, the company's own balance sheet investment returns have also suffered from headwinds in the alternative market. Overall, the company's performance between 2023 and 2025 has been modest and clearly below expectations.

## The valuation picture is clear

Overall, we believe the different methods essentially speak the same language. At the current earnings level, CapMan's share appears pricey, and there is no upside potential in the share. Similarly, if earnings improve as expected in the coming years, the share is cheap from virtually any angle. The key driver is naturally the

company's fee profit, which is by far CapMan's most valuable earnings component. The development of fee profit is the single most important metric followed by investors. The key driver of fee profit is, naturally, new sales, and if new sales are successful, fee profit has good prerequisites to scale significantly.

In the longer term, the key driver of the share is the return of CapMan's funds, as successful investment operations support new sales and increase carried interest income and investment income on the balance sheet.


Investors should also note that with the growth of fee profit, CapMan's earnings mix would significantly improve from the current level, which would raise its acceptable valuation level.

## Expected return relies on earnings growth

The expected return of the share relies mainly on earnings growth. Valuation multiples are high based on current earnings, and some of the earnings growth will be used to digest them. The dividend yield is typically high for CapMan, providing clear support for the share's overall expected return. However, we note that the dividend is also partly dependent on the growth of fee profit and the realization of carried interest. Overall, we estimate the share's expected return to be 10–20%, largely depending on the realization of earnings growth.

## Total shareholder return drivers 2025-2029e

■ Positive
 ■ Neutral
 ■ Negative



# Valuation 2/4

## Sum of the parts is the backbone of the valuation

We believe the sum of the parts is the best starting point for CapMan's valuation, as the company's various earnings components differ, e.g., in their risk profiles.

We have valued the fee profit of the Management Company business that generates recurring fees at 15x EV/EBIT, as the business is highly predictable and capital retention is high (mainly closed-end funds). In our view, the earnings share attributable to minorities should also be deducted from the fee profit, as it fully belongs to the Management Company business. Adjusted for minority interests, the fee profit realized in 2025 would be only about 5 MEUR, and based on this, the value of the Management Company business would be only 70 MEUR.

Similarly, if the company succeeds in scaling its operations in line with our expectations in the coming years, the fee profit will rise to 10–15 MEUR. Since the 2027 fee profit is, in our view, too high due to retroactive fees from the closing of large funds, we exceptionally use the 2028 estimate for valuation, which is lower than 2027. With the 2028 fee profit, the Management Company business would be valued at over 180 MEUR.

We have applied a 7x multiple to carried interest income, reflecting its low predictability. In CapMan's case, the poor predictability is emphasized, as carried interest income will, at least in the coming years, rely on only a few individual funds. The average for performance-related income over the preceding 5 years has been 5 MEUR, and our estimated average for 2026-2029 is approximately 8 MEUR. Applying these figures, we arrive at a value of 34-54 MEUR for performance fees. In our view, there would be upside in the multiple we apply if CapMan could prove in the coming



years that its funds are starting to generate carried interest across a broad front, as their predictability would improve.

The EV/EBIT ratio for the entire Management Company business is thus approximately 11–12x in our calculations, with a value of 105–237 MEUR. The range is exceptionally wide due to the subdued level of fee profit and the significant earnings growth expectations.

CapMan has significant balance sheet investments that we have valued at the balance sheet value of the assets, while the company applies the fair value method in its accounting. Our key assumption is that the return of the investment portfolio will, in the long run, roughly correspond to its required return. The value of the investment portfolio was 180 MEUR at the end of Q1'26.

At the end of Q1'26, CapMan had 109 MEUR in interest-bearing debt and a 69 MEUR cash position. In addition, the company has other assets of 5 MEUR (mainly shareholder loans) and tax liabilities of 7 MEUR (mainly related to the investment portfolio). Considering these items, CapMan has net debt of approximately 40 MEUR.

Overall, with these assumptions, we arrive at a value for CapMan's share capital of 240-380 MEUR or EUR 1.4-2.1. We note that if the fee profit were to scale as expected over the next two years, CapMan's Management Company business would, in all likelihood, be more valuable than it is now, as its acceptable multiple would have increased, especially when it comes to carried interest income. Similarly, if the growth in fee profit does not materialize for shareholders, it is difficult to see a substantial upside in the stock from current levels. We believe it is justified to price CapMan at the upper end of the range, as the drivers behind the realization of earnings improvement are very clear.



# Valuation 3/4

## Absolute valuation multiples

CapMan's structure differs significantly from the average listed asset management peer. The main difference is the large investment assets in CapMan's balance sheet, which materially affect the company's earnings mix. Despite this, we believe the sector medians provide a reasonable basis for CapMan's valuation, as the group of listed asset managers in Helsinki is very broad.

Over the last 10 and 5 years, CapMan has traded at an average P/E multiple of 14x, which is in line with the peer group's long-term levels (graphs on page 47). A key factor weighing on CapMan's valuation is naturally its weak earnings mix. The earnings are still highly dependent on investment income, and the share of fee profit is low. The strong scalability of fee profit would also be very important for valuation multiples, as an improvement in the earnings mix would raise acceptable valuation multiples. If the earnings mix were to remain at its current

level, it would be difficult to justify a valuation for CapMan higher than the historical level of its peer group. Correspondingly, as the earnings mix improves, a premium for CapMan would be warranted relative to its peers and to CapMan's own historical levels.

With the rather modest earnings realized in 2025, CapMan's P/E ratio is over 20x, which is high considering the weak earnings mix. In our view, it is clear that there is no upside in the current multiples, and shareholder returns must come from earnings growth. When earnings growth begins, multiples will quickly become very attractive, and already with the 2026 earnings improvement, the P/E will fall to 13x. With the peak earnings in 2027, the P/E is around 10x, which is very favorable. The dividend yield is also high at 7–8% and in line with CapMan's historical levels.


## Peer group

When assessing the relative valuation, we emphasize P/E ratios and dividend yield. EV-based multiples do not work well for many peers (e.g. minority interests, differences in balance sheet structures, etc.), and we do not consider their use reasonable.

CapMan trades at a hefty premium based on 2025 earnings, but with 2026-2027 multiples, the valuation falls to a discount. We do not believe the discount is warranted, and the peer group valuation speaks the same language as the absolute multiples and the sum-of-the-parts calculation: the share is cheap once the earnings improvement materializes.

Company	Peer group valuation	Market cap MEUR	EV MEUR	EV/EBIT		P/E		Dividend yield-%		P/B 2026e
				2026e	2027e	2026e	2027e	2026e	2027e	
Alexandria		126	112	8.0	7.6	12.4	11.9	7.5	7.9	3.2
Aktia		877	877			11.1	10.0	5.9	6.3	1.3
eQ		404	377	11.8	11.7	16.0	15.7	6.3	6.6	5.6
Evli		635	607	11.0	10.0	16.2	14.4	5.5	5.9	3.8
Taaleri		214	171	7.2	5.5	14.0	9.4	5.3	5.8	0.9
Titanium		65	52	8.7	11.5	13.2	16.5	7.3	5.9	4.3
United Bankers		221	221	12.5	10.4	16.8	13.8	6.0	6.5	3.4
Mandatium		2901	2827	22.1	16.6	26.2	18.9	14.8	9.9	3.5
CapMan (Inderes)		312	315	9.1	6.8	13.1	10.1	7.4	8.0	1.7
Average				11.6	10.5	15.7	13.8	7.3	6.8	3.2
Median				11.0	10.4	15.0	14.1	6.1	6.4	3.5
Diff-% to median				-16%	-35%	-13%	-28%	20%	24%	-52%

Source: Refinitiv / Inderes



# Valuation 4/4

## DCF model

We believe that at group-level the DCF model is somewhat unsuitable for CapMan. A significant portion of the company's earnings comes from its investment portfolio and performance fees, whose cash flows are uneven and difficult to predict. In addition, the risk profiles of these income sources clearly differ from the more stable management business, which makes applying a single required return to the entire group imprecise. Thus, we consider the SOTP calculation to be a much more useful valuation method, and the result of the DCF model should be viewed mainly as supporting it.

Our DCF model (p. 52) is based on the expectation that CapMan's sustainable EBIT level from now on is good 40 MEUR annually. The required return (WACC) of 9.2% is slightly below the average domestic peer. The DCF model also reflects the earlier theme: if the earnings mix were better, the WACC could easily be lower.

## Value of assets under management

As our final valuation method, we have used CapMan's assets under management (AUM). The value of the AUM varies significantly depending on the fee income level it produces and the risk related to being able to hold on to capital. As a rough generalization, the vast majority of AUM is valued at 1–5%, which is in line with historical M&A transactions.

CapMan's AUM is, by default, of very high quality, as a significant portion of it is in closed-end funds, its fee level is good, and most of its AUM includes performance-linked fees. A clear downside is that even though CapMan's AUM generates a lot of revenue, only a very limited fee profit remains for the owners.


With the current market capitalization of around 320 MEUR, the market computationally assigns a value of approximately 180 MEUR to the Management Company business. Relative to assets under management of 7.2 BEUR, this is around 2.5%. We consider the level to be low when compared to the high quality of capital. In our view, a higher value for CapMan's AUM could be warranted if the company were to generate more fee profit from AUM after minority interests.

Purely from an AUM quality perspective, a value of approximately 4–5% could be warranted for CapMan's AUM. Calculated this way, the Management Company business would be valued at 290–360 MEUR. However, this would require the Management Company's earnings to be significantly higher than they are now.

The matter can also be viewed from another angle: even though CapMan does not currently generate significant fee profit from its AUM, the value tied to this AUM could be realized through an acquisition. We believe it is clear that, as an acquisition target, CapMan would offer significant cost synergy potential to a buyer, and through this, the value in AUM could be realized. In our view, the upper limit of the calculation reflects this potential precisely.


Valuation	2026e	2027e	2028e
Share price	1.76	1.76	1.76
Number of shares, millions	177.4	177.9	178.4
Market cap	312	313	314
EV	315	316	306
P/E (oik.)	13.1	10.1	12.0
P/E	14.5	11.0	13.2
P/B	1.7	1.6	1.6
P/S	4.3	3.5	3.7
EV/Sales	4.3	3.6	3.6
EV/EBITDA	8.9	6.7	7.4
EV/EBIT (adj.)	9.1	6.8	7.5
Payout ratio (%)	107%	88%	112%
Dividend yield-%	7.4 %	8.0 %	8.5 %

Source: Inderes




# CapMan's historical valuation


CapMan's and peers' P/E ratio




CapMan's P/E ratio vs. peers' median



CapMan's and peers' dividend yield, %



CapMan's dividend yield % vs. average of peers




Source: Bloomberg, May 25, 2026

# Valuation table

Valuation	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026e	2027e	2028e	2029e
Share price	3.10	2.90	2.29	1.77	1.91	1.76	1.76	1.76	1.76
Number of shares, millions	156.6	158.1	158.6	176.9	176.9	177.4	177.9	178.4	178.9
Market cap	486	458	363	313	338	312	313	314	315
EV	513	506	426	289	347	315	316	306	299
P/E (oik.)	16.5	11.7	neg.	40.7	21.4	13.1	10.1	12.0	11.7
P/E	16.5	12.5	neg.	4.6	25.6	14.5	11.0	13.2	12.6
P/B	3.9	3.3	3.2	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6
P/S	10.6	7.8	7.4	5.4	5.4	4.3	3.5	3.7	3.5
EV/Sales	11.2	8.6	8.6	5.0	5.5	4.3	3.6	3.6	3.3
EV/EBITDA	12.5	9.3	>100	15.2	13.2	8.9	6.7	7.4	7.1
EV/EBIT (adj.)	12.9	9.6	>100	15.2	13.4	9.1	6.8	7.5	7.3
Payout ratio (%)	80.1%	73.4%	neg.	36.0%	161.0%	106.9%	87.5%	112.2%	114.5%
Dividend yield-%	4.8%	5.9%	4.4%	7.9%	6.3%	7.4%	8.0%	8.5%	9.1%

Source: Inderes



# Peer group valuation

Peer group valuation Company	Market cap MEUR	EV MEUR	EV/EBIT		P/E		Dividend yield-%		P/B 2026e
			2026e	2027e	2026e	2027e	2026e	2027e	
Alexandria	125	111	7.9	7.5	12.3	11.8	7.6	8.0	3.2
Aktia	860	860			10.9	9.8	6.0	6.4	1.2
eQ	394	367	11.4	11.3	15.6	15.3	6.4	6.8	5.4
Evli	619	591	10.7	9.7	15.8	14.0	5.6	6.0	3.7
Taaleri	216	173	7.3	5.6	14.1	9.5	5.3	5.8	0.9
Titanium	64	52	8.6	11.4	13.1	16.4	7.3	5.9	4.2
United Bankers	215	215	12.2	10.2	16.4	13.5	6.2	6.7	3.4
Mandatum	2939	2865	22.4	16.8	26.6	19.2	14.6	9.8	3.5
CapMan (Inderes)	312	315	9.1	6.8	13.1	10.1	7.4	8.0	1.7
Average			11.5	10.4	15.6	13.7	7.4	6.9	3.2
Median			10.7	10.2	14.8	13.8	6.3	6.5	3.4
Diff-% to median			-14%	-33%	-12%	-26%	17%	22%	-52%

Source: Refinitiv / Inderes

# Income statement

Income statement	2024	Q1'25	Q2'25	Q3'25	Q4'25	2025	Q1'26	Q2'26e	Q3'26e	Q4'26e	2026e	2027e	2028e	2029e
Revenue	57.6	13.0	14.1	15.4	20.5	63.0	16.3	18.0	16.4	22.6	73.3	88.6	85.0	89.3
Management company business	56.8	13.0	14.1	15.4	20.5	63.0	16.3	18.0	16.4	22.6	73.3	88.6	85.0	89.3
Service business	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Investment business	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
EBITDA	19.1	7.6	3.1	8.6	6.9	26.2	6.4	9.5	8.2	11.3	35.3	47.4	41.4	41.8
Depreciation	-2.4	-0.7	-0.7	-0.8	-0.8	-3.0	-0.8	-0.8	-0.8	-0.8	-3.2	-3.2	-3.2	-3.1
EBIT (excl. NRI)	19.0	7.3	3.3	8.5	6.7	25.8	6.1	9.3	8.0	11.1	34.4	46.5	40.7	40.7
EBIT	16.7	6.9	2.4	7.8	6.1	23.2	5.6	8.7	7.4	10.5	32.1	44.1	38.3	38.7
Management company business	17.2	1.2	0.5	3.1	2.9	7.7	2.0	3.3	3.1	6.3	14.7	26.6	20.3	21.7
Service business	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Investment business	6.9	5.7	1.9	4.8	3.1	15.5	3.6	5.4	4.3	4.3	17.5	17.5	18.0	17.0
Other	-7.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Net financial items	-4.3	-1.4	-1.6	-1.3	-1.9	-6.1	-0.9	-1.2	-1.2	-1.2	-4.5	-4.5	-4.1	-2.8
PTP	76.6	5.6	0.8	6.6	4.2	17.1	4.7	7.5	6.2	9.3	27.6	39.7	34.2	35.9
Taxes	-3.0	-0.6	-0.2	-0.4	-0.1	-1.3	-0.5	-0.7	-0.6	-0.8	-2.6	-7.5	-6.5	-6.8
Minority interest	-4.9	-0.8	-0.5	-0.8	-0.5	-2.6	-0.9	-0.9	-0.7	-1.0	-3.5	-3.7	-3.9	-4.1
Net earnings	68.8	4.1	0.1	5.4	3.5	13.2	3.3	5.9	4.9	7.5	21.6	28.5	23.8	25.0
EPS (adj.)	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.13	0.17	0.15	0.15
EPS (rep.)	0.39	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.16	0.13	0.14

Key figures	2024	Q1'25	Q2'25	Q3'25	Q4'25	2025	Q1'26	Q2'26e	Q3'26e	Q4'26e	2026e	2027e	2028e	2029e
Revenue growth-%	16.8 %	-16.8 %	-8.2 %	20.6 %	48.2 %	9.4 %	25.2 %	27.3 %	6.7 %	10.4 %	16.3 %	20.9 %	-4.1 %	5.0 %
Adjusted EBIT growth-%	2330.9 %	7.8 %	24.8 %	400.0 %	-14.2 %	36.2 %	-16.5 %	182.5 %	-6.5 %	64.7 %	33.3 %	35.2 %	-12.6 %	0.0 %
EBITDA-%	33.1 %	58.5 %	21.9 %	56.0 %	33.7 %	41.6 %	39.4 %	52.7 %	49.6 %	50.0 %	48.2 %	53.4 %	48.7 %	46.8 %
Adjusted EBIT-%	32.9 %	56.2 %	23.3 %	55.1 %	32.9 %	41.0 %	37.5 %	51.6 %	48.3 %	49.1 %	47.0 %	52.5 %	47.8 %	45.5 %
Net earnings-%	119.4 %	31.9 %	1.0 %	35.0 %	17.1 %	20.9 %	20.4 %	32.8 %	29.7 %	33.0 %	29.4 %	32.1 %	28.0 %	28.0 %

Source: Inderes

# Balance sheet

Assets	2024	2025	2026e	2027e	2028e
Non-current assets	215	237	231	235	224
Goodwill	30.1	32.5	32.5	32.5	32.5
Intangible assets	12.4	16.7	15.1	13.6	12.2
Tangible assets	2.9	6.4	6.8	7.2	7.6
Associated companies	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other investments	168	179	175	180	170
Other non-current assets	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Deferred tax assets	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8
Current assets	128	101	115	111	89.6
Inventories	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other current assets	7.1	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.4
Receivables	27.4	31.0	35.9	43.4	41.7
Cash and equivalents	93.9	64.5	73.3	62.1	42.5
Balance sheet total	343	338	346	346	314

Source: Inderes

Liabilities & equity	2024	2025	2026e	2027e	2028e
Equity	203	194	195	200	199
Share capital	35.2	35.2	35.2	35.2	35.2
Retained earnings	104	93.3	93.7	99.1	98.0
Hybrid bonds	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Revaluation reserve	38.4	38.4	38.4	38.4	38.4
Other equity	21.1	21.1	21.1	21.1	21.1
Minorities	3.8	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3
Non-current liabilities	110	116	120	108	78.7
Deferred tax liabilities	8.5	9.3	9.3	9.3	9.3
Provisions	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Interest bearing debt	101	105	109	97.1	67.6
Convertibles	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other long term liabilities	0.5	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8
Current liabilities	30.4	27.1	31.5	37.8	36.1
Interest bearing debt	1.3	1.1	0.1	0.4	0.1
Payables	19.4	23.2	28.6	34.6	33.2
Other current liabilities	9.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8
Balance sheet total	343	338	346	346	314


# DCF-calculation

DCF model	2025	2026e	2027e	2028e	2029e	2030e	2031e	2032e	2033e	2034e	2035e	TERM
Revenue growth-%	9.4 %	16.3 %	20.9 %	-4.1 %	5.0 %	5.0 %	5.0 %	3.0 %	3.0 %	3.0 %	2.5 %	2.5 %
EBIT-%	36.9 %	43.8 %	49.8 %	45.0 %	43.3 %	43.0 %	42.0 %	41.0 %	40.0 %	40.0 %	40.0 %	40.0 %
EBIT (operating profit)	23.2	32.1	44.1	38.3	38.7	40.3	41.3	41.6	41.8	43.0	44.1	
+ Depreciation	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	
- Paid taxes	-0.6	-2.6	-7.5	-6.5	-6.8	-7.2	-7.3	-7.4	-7.5	-7.8	-8.0	
- Tax, financial expenses	-0.5	-0.4	-1.2	-1.0	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	
+ Tax, financial income	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	
- Change in working capital	-5.2	0.5	-1.5	0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.5	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	
Operating cash flow	20.0	32.8	37.4	34.5	34.0	35.3	36.1	36.5	36.6	37.7	38.6	
+ Change in other long-term liabilities	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
- Gross CAPEX	-24.5	2.2	-7.1	7.8	7.7	-2.4	-2.5	-2.6	-2.7	-2.8	-2.7	
Free operating cash flow	-3.3	35.0	30.3	42.3	41.7	32.9	33.6	33.9	33.9	34.9	36.0	
+/- Other	3.0	-3.0	-2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
FCFF	-0.3	32.0	28.3	42.3	41.7	32.9	33.6	33.9	33.9	34.9	36.0	551
Discounted FCFF		30.4	24.6	33.7	30.4	22.0	20.6	19.0	17.4	16.4	15.5	237
Sum of FCFF present value		467	436	412	378	348	326	305	286	269	252	237
Enterprise value DCF		467										
- Interest bearing debt		-106.1										
+ Cash and cash equivalents		64.5										
+ Associated companies		64.1										
-Minorities		-31.5										
-Dividend/capital return		-21.2										
Equity value DCF		436										
Equity value DCF per share		2.5										

WACC	
Tax-% (WACC)	20.0 %
Target debt ratio (D/(D+E))	20.0 %
Cost of debt	5.5 %
Equity Beta	1.45
Market risk premium	4.75%
Liquidity premium	1.00%
Risk free interest rate	2.5 %
Cost of equity	10.4 %
Weighted average cost of capital (WACC)	9.2 %


Source: Inderes

## Cash flow distribution




# DCF sensitivity calculations and key assumptions in graphs


Sensitivity of DCF to changes in the WACC-%




Sensitivity of DCF to changes in the risk-free rate



Sensitivity of DCF to changes in the terminal EBIT margin



Growth and profitability assumptions in the DCF calculation



Source: Inderes. Note that the weight of the terminal value (%) is shown on an inverse scale for clarity.

# Summary

Income statement	2023	2024	2025	2026e	2027e	Per share data	2023	2024	2025	2026e	2027e
Revenue	49.3	57.6	63.0	73.3	88.6	EPS (reported)	-0.02	0.39	0.07	0.12	0.16
EBITDA	0.2	19.1	26.2	35.3	47.4	EPS (adj.)	-0.01	0.04	0.09	0.13	0.17
EBIT	-1.3	16.7	23.2	32.1	44.1	OCF / share	0.06	0.08	0.11	0.19	0.21
PTP	-2.0	76.6	17.1	27.6	39.7	OFCF / share	0.07	0.30	0.00	0.18	0.16
Net Income	-3.4	68.8	13.2	21.6	28.5	Book value / share	0.71	1.12	1.06	1.06	1.09
Extraordinary items	-2.0	-2.3	-2.6	-2.3	-2.4	Dividend / share	0.10	0.14	0.12	0.13	0.14
Balance sheet	2023	2024	2025	2026e	2027e	Growth and profitability	2023	2024	2025	2026e	2027e
Balance sheet total	241.4	343.3	337.6	345.9	346.0	Revenue growth-%	-16%	17%	9%	16%	21%
Equity capital	115.1	202.7	194.4	194.7	200.1	EBITDA growth-%	-100%	7943%	38%	35%	34%
Goodwill	7.9	30.1	32.5	32.5	32.5	EBIT (adj.) growth-%	-99%	2331%	36%	33%	35%
Net debt	52.8	8.6	41.6	35.4	35.4	EPS (adj.) growth-%	-103%	-604%	105%	51%	29%
Cash flow	2023	2024	2025	2026e	2027e	EBITDA-%	0.5 %	33.1 %	41.6 %	48.2 %	53.4 %
EBITDA	0.2	19.1	26.2	35.3	47.4	EBIT (adj.)-%	1.6 %	32.9 %	41.0 %	47.0 %	52.5 %
Change in working capital	11.5	-4.3	-5.2	0.5	-1.5	EBIT-%	-2.6 %	28.9 %	36.9 %	43.8 %	49.8 %
Operating cash flow	9.6	13.4	20.0	32.8	37.4	ROE-%	-2.7 %	44.1 %	6.8 %	11.5 %	14.9 %
CAPEX	8.1	-44.2	-24.5	2.2	-7.1	ROI-%	-0.6 %	31.5 %	7.7 %	10.6 %	15.3 %
Free cash flow	10.9	52.3	-0.3	32.0	28.3	Equity ratio	47.7 %	59.0 %	57.6 %	56.3 %	57.8 %
						Gearing	45.9 %	4.2 %	21.4 %	18.2 %	17.7 %
Valuation multiples	2023	2024	2025	2026e	2027e						
EV/S	8.6	5.0	5.5	4.3	3.6						
EV/EBITDA	>100	15.2	13.2	8.9	6.7						
EV/EBIT (adj.)	>100	15.2	13.4	9.1	6.8						
P/E (adj.)	neg.	40.7	21.4	13.1	10.1						
P/B	3.2	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.6						
Dividend-%	4.4 %	7.9 %	6.3 %	7.4 %	8.0 %						

Source: Inderes

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Buy	The 12-month risk-adjusted expected shareholder return of the share is very attractive
Accumulate	The 12-month risk-adjusted expected shareholder return of the share is attractive
Reduce	The 12-month risk-adjusted expected shareholder return of the share is weak
Sell	The 12-month risk-adjusted expected shareholder return of the share is very weak

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## Recommendation history (>12 mo)

Date	Recommendation	Target	Share price
8/9/2019	Buy	2.00 €	1.75 €
9/26/2019	Accumulate	2.00 €	1.87 €
11/1/2019	Reduce	2.10 €	2.06 €
1/31/2020	Buy	2.75 €	2.48 €
3/20/2020	Buy	2.00 €	1.52 €
4/7/2020	Accumulate	1.90 €	1.70 €
4/24/2020	Accumulate	1.90 €	1.76 €
8/7/2020	Accumulate	2.10 €	1.96 €
10/30/2020	Accumulate	2.10 €	1.93 €
2/5/2021	Accumulate	2.80 €	2.63 €
2/22/2021	Accumulate	2.80 €	2.68 €
4/30/2021	Accumulate	3.00 €	2.78 €
8/6/2021	Accumulate	3.30 €	3.04 €
10/28/2021	Accumulate	3.30 €	2.98 €
1/5/2022	Accumulate	3.30 €	3.10 €
2/4/2022	Accumulate	3.30 €	3.00 €
3/21/2022	Accumulate	3.10 €	2.81 €
4/29/2022	Buy	3.10 €	2.62 €
8/5/2022	Accumulate	3.30 €	3.09 €
10/28/2022	Accumulate	3.00 €	2.60 €
11/14/2022	Accumulate	3.00 €	2.58 €
2/3/2022	Accumulate	3.10 €	2.89 €
5/2/2023	Accumulate	2.90 €	2.59 €
8/4/2023	Accumulate	2.70 €	2.57 €
10/27/2023	Accumulate	2.40 €	2.06 €
2/8/2024	Accumulate	2.20 €	1.96 €
3/6/2024	Accumulate	2.20 €	1.94 €
5/6/2024	Reduce	2.20 €	2.10 €
6/3/2024	Accumulate	2.20 €	1.91 €
8/8/2024	Accumulate	2.10 €	1.78 €
10/7/2024	Accumulate	2.10 €	1.92 €
10/14/2024	Accumulate	2.10 €	1.89 €
11/8/2024	Accumulate	2.10 €	1.77 €
2/14/2025	Accumulate	2.10 €	1.87 €
5/12/2025	Accumulate	2.10 €	1.83 €
8/8/2025	Accumulate	2.10 €	1.85 €
11/7/2025	Accumulate	2.10 €	1.85 €
2/13/2026	Accumulate	2.10 €	1.79 €
5/7/2026	Accumulate	2.10 €	1.80 €
5/29/2026	Accumulate	2.10 €	1.76 €



# CONNECTING INVESTORS AND COMPANIES.

Inderes democratizes financial information by connecting investors and listed companies. For investors, we are an investing community and a trusted source of financial information and equity research. For listed companies, we are a partner in delivering high-quality investor relations. Over 500 listed companies in Europe use our investor relations products and equity research services to provide better investor communications to their shareholders.

Our goal is to be the most investor-minded company in finance. Inderes was founded in 2009 by investors, for investors. As a Nasdaq First North-listed company, we understand the day-to-day reality of our customers.

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